


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AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF JAMES N. ROSENAU'S
"PRE-THEORIES AND THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY"



MARION JEAN ABLAS

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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ABSTRACT

This thesis represents an attempt to evaluate the utility of the conceptual framework presented by James N. Rosenau in "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy". In order to assess the applicability of this model to the analysis of specific issues, the determinants of the Canadian government's recognition policy toward the Chinese People's Republic are examined within Rosenau's framework.

Rosenau's theoretical model is first set forth and discussed. Consideration is then given to the legal aspects of recognition in order to determine whether or not China is eligible for recognition -- both in the opinion of international law authorities and in the light of Canadian precedent. The bases -- legal and non-legal -- of the American policy of non-recognition are also discussed. It is assumed that the United States has exerted considerable influence upon Canadian policy; it is important, therefore, to examine the considerations upon which American policy is based in order to demonstrate why non-recognition is such a salient policy that the United States would encourage its Canadian ally to pursue a similar policy.

The primary determinants of Canadian policy on this issue appear to be societal (public opinion) and systemic (American influence). Chapters IV and V deal with the impact of these factors.

In the concluding Chapter, Rosenau's pre-theory is evaluated in terms of its applicability to this specific issue, and some of the problems inherent in his conceptual scheme are discussed. Because of the admittedly restricted nature of this study, the conclusions drawn in this thesis are extremely limited and, at best, tentative. Hopefully, however, it represents a first step toward the operationalization of Rosenau's framework.

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CHAPTER I

AN EXAMINATION OF ROSENAU'S FRAMEWORK

The primary goal of foreign policy analysis is to isolate the essential components of foreign policy and to determine the relationship between them in order to describe, explain, and eventually predict the external behaviour of nations. James N. Rosenau believes that, despite a widespread recognition by foreign policy analysts that "foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors", the development of foreign policy theory has been impeded by the failure of analysts to "comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other."¹ In short, Rosenau perceives foreign policy analysis to be devoid of general theory. In order to rectify this shortcoming, Rosenau, in "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", sets forth a conceptual model or "pre-theory" to explain the determinants of a nation's external behaviour. The purpose of a pre-theory is two-fold; it is to provide "both an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events and a general orientation toward all events. . . ."²

In this thesis, an attempt will be made to evaluate the utility of Rosenau's pre-theory and to examine the

validity of the premises upon which the pre-theory is based by applying his framework to a specific issue. Accordingly, the determinants of the Canadian government's recognition policy toward the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) will be examined within the framework presented by Rosenau. Although no actual measurement of the relative strengths of the determinants of Canada's policy is attempted, I have assumed that it is possible to assess crudely the relative strengths of two of these determinants -- societal and systemic. It should then be possible to evaluate the applicability of Rosenau's conceptual model by comparing his predicted ranking of these variables and the ranking suggested by an examination of the available empirical data.

Ideally, a pre-theory should establish a general orientation toward all events by providing similarly processed empirical materials. That is, in order to subject empirical data to rigorous theoretical analysis, the data should first be rendered comparable. The establishment of a pre-theory of foreign policy analysis also involves "the need to develop an explicit conception of where causation is located in more than one source, to discover "to what extent and under what circumstances . . . each source [is] more or less causal than the others."³ Further, a pre-theory should be sufficiently comprehensive to

explain the external behaviour of a number of nations, yet sufficiently precise to explain specific policies of individual nations.

Rosenau believes that "all pre-theories of foreign policy are either five-dimensional or translatable into five dimensions."⁴ The determinants of Canada's policy toward the CPR may therefore be examined by reformulating the internal and external factors which have influenced the government's behaviour on the issue of recognition into the five sets of variables which Rosenau presents. The five dimensions, "in order of increasing temporal and spatial distance from the external behaviors for which they serve as sources", are idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic.⁵

In order to predict the relative potency of each set of variables, it is necessary to posit Canada as a large or small country, with a developed or underdeveloped economy, and with an open or closed polity. Canada will be posited as a large, developed and open society; this classification is necessarily arbitrary because Rosenau fails to provide sufficient criteria for determining a rationale for each division. The assumptions upon which my classification of Canada is based are as follows. First, in the diagrammatic presentation of his pre-theory

(see Table I), Rosenau indicates that countries are to be categorized as large or small according to their geographical size and their possession of physical resources. Population is not mentioned as a criterion and the development of physical resources is used as a measure of the state of the nation's economy rather than its size. If, therefore, geographical size and possession of resources determine the size of the country, then Canada is a large nation. Second, if the state of a nation's economy is determined by that country's Gross National Product, its per capita income, and levels of urbanizations and literacy, then Canada has a developed economy. (It is assumed that a nation's economy is considered to be developed or underdeveloped in relation to the development of other nations' economies. Canada's economy could conceivably be posited as underdeveloped if its actual development of resources were compared with its potential development.) Finally, if the state of a nation's polity is assumed to be determined by such factors as the presence or absence of a constitutional government, by the existence of a free or controlled press, and by that government's acceptance or disallowance of organized opposition, then Canada has an open polity.⁶ Indeed, the fact that societal factors are ranked fifth in relative potency in all closed systems suggests that Rosenau has characterized the polity

TABLE I

AN ABBREVIATED PRESENTATION OF THE AUTHOR'S PRE-THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY, IN WHICH FIVE SETS OF VARIABLES UNDERLYING THE EXTERNAL BEHAVIOR OF SOCIETIES ARE RANKED ACCORDING TO THEIR RELATIVE POTENCIES IN EIGHT TYPES OF SOCIETIES

Geography and physical resources	Large Country			Small Country		
	Developed		Underdeveloped	Developed		Underdeveloped
State of the economy						
State of the Polity	Open	Closed	Open	Closed	Open	Closed
Rankings of the variables	Role Societal Govern- mental Systemic Idiosyn- cratic	Role Idiosyn- cratic Govern- mental Systemic Societal	Idiosyn- cratic Role Societal Systemic Govern- mental	Idiosyn- cratic Role Societal Govern- mental Idiosyn- cratic	Role Systemic Idiosyn- cratic Govern- mental Societal	Idiosyn- cratic Systemic Role Societal Govern- mental Societal
Illustrative examples	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	India	Red China	Holland	Czecho- slovakia
						Kenya
						Ghana

of societies as open or closed on the basis of the potential ability of non-governmental factors within a society to influence the government's external policy.

If, then, Canada is a large country with a developed economy and an open polity, the following ranking -- in order of the relative influence each determinant exerts upon the formation of Canadian foreign policy -- should obtain: role, societal, governmental, systemic, idiosyncratic. In order to assess the usefulness of this model, it seems relevant to pose two questions. First, does the conceptual scheme fulfill the criterion suggested by Harold and Margaret Sprout -- "parallel categories should be mutually exclusive. That is to say data should fit into no more than one category"?⁷ Second, are the sets of variables comparable?

With regard to the first criterion, Rosenau specifies that it is necessary to determine the manner in which, and the extent to which, the factors determining the formation of foreign policy intermix.⁸ Nevertheless, in order to assess the relative strength of each set of variables for the purpose of tracing causation, there must be discernible boundaries between the sets.

A brief examination of the formation of foreign policy in Canada suggests that there is a spillover between

the idiosyncratic, role and governmental sets of variables. The governmental variables -- which include "those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers"⁹ -- determine the potency of the role which the decision-maker occupies. The role variables refer to "the external behavior of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncracies of the role occupants."¹⁰ Decision-makers, however, vary in their perception of their roles according to idiosyncratic factors -- "all those aspects of a decision-maker -- his values, talents and prior experiences -- that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behavior from those of every other decision-maker."¹¹

In the Canadian parliamentary system, foreign policy is formulated primarily within the Cabinet on the advice of the Department of External Affairs.

Parliament may debate general principles and challenge particular points, but the responsibility for the formulation and direction of policy rests solely on the government in power, which must consider not only events external to the country [systemic factors] but the trends of public opinion [societal influences] within it.¹²

Political responsibility for foreign policy is thus focused in the executive; moreover, within the Cabinet, the Prime Minister's role is pre-eminent.

The governmental structure defines the role of the Prime Minister. In turn, the role occupied by the Prime Minister enables him to determine the extent to which other members of the government will participate in policy formation. Constitutionally, the ability of Parliament to influence policy is limited. The House of Commons must approve money or legislation needed to effect policy, but the Government's majority in the House generally ensures approval.¹³ In practice, the role of the House on foreign policy issues is limited to its ability to influence the Government by discussion and debate. Parliament may of course threaten the defeat of the Government through a vote of non-confidence. However, on the whole, "the legislative body is relatively docile and confines itself to asking questions, setting limits on policy, and suggesting alternatives."¹⁴ Even this limited degree of influence is dependent upon the whims of the government in power and, in particular, upon the idiosyncracies of the Prime Minister. "A member may ask questions; a minister need not answer. The Opposition may demand discussion; the Government may refuse time for debate."¹⁵

In addition, the Prime Minister's role permits him to utilize the resources of the Department of External Affairs to a greater or lesser degree. Idiosyncratic factors account for differences in the relationships

between each Prime Minister and the Department. St. Laurent and Pearson, for instance, attributed greater importance to the role of the Department in shaping policy than did Diefenbaker. Trevor Lloyd, e.g., has observed that "the Department of External Affairs . . . did not gain Mr. Diefenbaker's respect."¹⁶ The varying degrees of emphasis placed on the role of the Department were based on differing perceptions of the importance of foreign policy being made by experts rather than politicians.¹⁷ Further, the Conservative government's suspicion that "the Civil Service might be too closely tied to the Liberals who had built it up"¹⁸ partially accounted for Diefenbaker's relatively limited reliance on the advice of the Department.

The Prime Minister's role also provides him with the latitude to delegate as much or as little authority as he wishes to the Secretary of State for External Affairs who represents the primary link between the Cabinet and the Department of External Affairs. It is the Prime Minister's function to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers and to assign portfolios. Until 1946, Canada had never had a separate Secretary of State for External Affairs; the Prime Minister had previously occupied this office in addition to his own. Since 1946, successive Prime Ministers have differed in their willingness to grant a wide degree of latitude to their foreign ministers. James Eayrs

has observed that Diefenbaker, for example, "seemed reluctant to allow Mr. Green [or Mr. Smith] the latitude Mr. St. Laurent had permitted Mr. Pearson."¹⁹ Whether the Prime Minister and his Secretary of State for External Affairs "contrive a mutually profitable division of labour, or whether their energies are dissipated in rivalry, will depend mainly upon their temperaments; especially will it depend upon the temperament of the Prime Minister."²⁰

Thus the idiosyncratic, governmental and role factors are interrelated inasmuch as the governmental variable determines the potency of the role variables and each occupant of the Prime Minister's role may determine the amount of authority which he retains or delegates to his subordinates or to other organs of the government.

The foregoing indicates that it is indeed a simpler task to determine the intermix between the sets of variables than it is to discern distinguishable boundaries between the sets. If, however, it is possible to isolate each set of factors, can the relative strengths of each set be compared? Disregarding the effects of penetration, only one of the five sets of variables -- the systemic set -- includes external influences.²¹ Systemic variables are comprised of "any nonhuman aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by

its officials."²² There would appear to be a large discrepancy between the scope of the systemic set and the scope of the other sets. That is, Rosenau has distinguished between the elements comprising internal factors, but he has failed to differentiate between the elements which together compose external factors.

Further, certain sets of factors may be more constant than others. For example, when examining a specific policy it may be possible to rank the relative potency of its determinants according to the ranking suggested by Rosenau. Yet within a specified period of time, e.g., a particular government's term in office, it is also possible that the strength of such factors as role, governmental, and possibly idiosyncratic may be established and held constant, whereas the strength of the societal and systemic factors may vary considerably within this period. If this were the case, then in successive assessments of the relative strength of the variables, vastly different rankings could be obtained. This problem may, however, be resolved if it is assumed that implicit in Rosenau's theory is the consideration that each set of variables should be ranked according to its potential strength. This would then suggest that in Canada, for example, although the societal set of variables, i.e., "those non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its

external behavior,"²³ may be relatively weak on certain issues at certain times, this set is potentially capable of exerting a greater influence upon external behaviour than any other set of variables except the role set. Similarly, the systemic factors, at maximum potency, would exert an influence greater than the idiosyncratic factors, but less than the others.

This interpretation is necessary in order to theoretically compare the relative potencies of each set between nations. However, it confounds operationalization within a particular country. Assume, for instance, that public opinion is a valid indicator of societal factors. Rosenau postulates that societal factors are significantly more potent in large, developed and open countries than in large, developed and closed countries. Hence it follows that public opinion will influence the government to a greater degree on any specific issue in Canada than in the Soviet Union. However, within Canada, public opinion may be aroused -- and exert influence upon the government -- on certain issues but may remain dormant on others. In the latter instance, external pressures upon decision-makers may be particularly strong. If the government formulates a policy in response to the external pressures, does this not suggest that systemic rather than societal factors have exerted the greater influence upon the

government's behaviour? Or should one assume that if public opinion had become aroused and had exerted a counter-influence, the government would have been influenced primarily by societal considerations? The latter conclusion is clearly meaningless in terms of explaining the government's behaviour. Thus to assume that the relative potency of the five sets of variables is determined by their potential maximum strengths is essential for multi-national comparison but is of limited utility in explaining the determinants of specific policies within a particular nation.

It appears then that Rosenau's framework is best suited to cross-national comparison. This type of comparison would seem to be more amenable to measurement, and hence more fruitful, than a comparison of the relative strengths of each set of variables within a particular nation.

Rigorous and extensive empirical testing will be necessary to confirm or disconfirm Rosenau's pre-theory. A multitude of issues with a variety of states would have to be analysed in order to determine whether or not Rosenau's framework accurately explains the external behaviour of nations. In this thesis only one issue -- Canadian recognition of China -- has been selected, and only two variables -- societal and systemic -- are considered. These two sets of variables were chosen primarily

because they can be isolated more readily than the others. The boundaries of the governmental, role, and idiosyncratic factors are difficult to distinguish; these three sets appear to constitute the formal decision-making process generally. Systemic and societal factors are external to this process. The empirical evidence presented should also suggest whether or not Canada is a penetrated political system with regard to this issue. Until this distinction is made, no attempt will be made to differentiate between external factors which are systemic in nature and those which constitute penetration.

The restricted nature of this study limits the value of any conclusions that are suggested by the presentation and interpretation of the empirical data. Whether or not Rosenau's framework can be utilized to provide a satisfactory explanation of the determinants of the Canadian government's recognition policy, an examination of a single issue can neither confirm nor disconfirm his hypotheses. At most, this study represents an attempt to discover whether or not Rosenau's conceptual framework provides a useful tool for analysing foreign policy, and to recognize, rather than solve, the problems involved.

FOOTNOTES

¹James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 31.

²Ibid., p. 41.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 42.

⁵Ibid., pp. 42-43.

⁶These criteria are suggested by Patrick McGowan in "Africa and Non-alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, XII (September, 1968), 285-286.

⁷Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 37.

⁸Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 31.

⁹Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Richard A. Preston, Canada in World Affairs, 1959-1961 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 17.

¹³James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 103.

¹⁴R. Barry Farrell, "Foreign Policies of Open and Closed Political Societies", Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. by R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 193.

¹⁵Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, p. 103.

¹⁶Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 20-22.

¹⁷Preston, Canada in World Affairs, p. 8.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, p. 28; see also
Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, pp. 17-18; Preston, Canada
in World Affairs, p. 7.

²⁰Eayrs, The Art of the Possible, p. 24.

²¹The concept of penetration will be discussed in
Chapter VI. Suffice it to note that the effects of pene-
tration by non-members of a state may be so extensive that
external influences pervade the realm of societal variables.

²²Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 43.

²³Ibid.

CHAPTER II

LEGAL ASPECTS OF RECOGNITION AND AMERICAN RECOGNITION TOWARD CHINA

Although recognition is a political act insofar as it is withheld or granted by the political, rather than the judicial, branch of an existing government, certain legal consequences flow from its extension.¹ Moreover, legal criteria for the extension of recognition have been established both by the practice of states and by the body of literature on international law. Ideally, therefore, the granting or withholding of recognition should be based solely on the consideration of legal factors. In practice, however, "the subject of recognition has been unfortunately obscured by political and diplomatic considerations. Recognition has been delayed, refused, or granted for reasons not usually of a legal nature."²

In this Chapter, the principles of international law pertaining to the recognition of governments will be examined. Because the major systemic factor which affects the formation of Canada's policy toward China is assumed to be the influence which the United States exerts upon the Canadian government,³ it is instructive also to examine the determinants of the United States policy of

nonrecognition of the CPR. If American policy were based on purely legal considerations, it would be likely that Canada, perceiving the same factors, would withhold recognition also -- regardless of external or internal pressures. However the desire of the United States for its allies to follow similar policies of non-recognition indicates that, to a significant degree, American policy is based on extra-legal factors. In order to determine the extent to which American policy is based on legal factors, relevant examples of United States precedent will be presented. Official statements will also be examined to illustrate the American government's interpretation of the theoretical principles of international law relating to the issue of Chinese recognition. Finally, the effect of moral and political factors upon governmental policy will be considered and an attempt will be made to assess roughly the relative importance of these determinants -- as compared to legal factors -- in determining the United States' policy.

Recognition [of a new government or state] is both a declaration of fact [i.e., acknowledgement of the existence of the new regime] and an expression of the intention to enter into political relations with the Power recognised. As a declaration of fact, it is both irrevocable and incapable of being subject to conditions; as an expression of the intention to enter into political relations, it is both revocable and capable of being subject to conditions.⁴

To be eligible for recognition, the new government must at least fulfill the basic condition created by the practice of states and reflected in the writings of international law authorities: the government must have established effective territorial control with the prospect of a reasonable degree of permanence. In order to meet this condition, a government must be a stable one "which does not recognise any outside superior authority; it must rule supreme within a territory -- with more or less settled frontiers -- and it must exercise control over a certain number of people."⁵

A second criterion, often regarded as essential for the recognition of a new government, is the ability of that government to "exercise its authority with the properly expressed consent of the people."⁶ United States precedent was established by Jefferson when the American government recognized the revolutionary French regime as the new government of France in 1793. He emphasized that despite the revolutionary -- rather than constitutional -- origins of the government, "[i]t accords with our principles to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared."⁷ However, "the will of the nation, substantially declared" has been variously interpreted in the United States as passive acquiescence by the populace and as a formal

demonstration of approval by popular, Western-type elections.⁸ Senator Robert C. Byrd has enunciated this latter view in an attempt to demonstrate that the CPR is not eligible for recognition. He denies that the Chinese Communist government represents "the will of the nation". Because there have been no free elections in China, he concludes that the government of the CPR is not "a government based on the consent of the governed."⁹

T. C. Chen disagrees with this interpretation; he questions the necessity for a democratic test. Instead, he considers the "habitual, though not willing, obedience" of the people to be sufficient because to demand voluntary obedience would compel one "to deny that any form of government other than a democracy (and what is 'democracy'?) is entitled to recognition."¹⁰

On the whole, the attitude of the United States prior to World War I was, according to H. Lauterpacht, characterized by an emphasis on the "notions of legality and constitutionality."¹¹ However, in 1922, Secretary of State Hughes issued a statement which indicated official abandonment of the rigid application of a democratic test.

[W]hile this Government has laid stress upon the value of expressed popular approval in determining whether a new government should be recognized, it has never insisted that the will of the people of a foreign State may not be manifested by long-continued

acquiescence in a regime actually functioning as a government.¹²

If a new government is found to exercise effective control over its territory and obtains the support of the populace, it has fulfilled the conditions established by the principles of international law for the granting of de facto recognition.

Two additional factors -- the willingness of a new government to fulfill its international obligations and the origin of the new government (that is, whether it has attained power through revolutionary or constitutional means) -- are not generally regarded by international law authorities as relevant in the granting of de facto recognition, but in the practice of individual states, they are frequently considered to be of major importance. With regard to the latter criterion, legal authorities agree that "generally, there is, in principle, no difference between a constitutional and a revolutionary change of government."¹³ Oppenheim, for example, believes that the revolutionary origin of the new government (although frequently accompanied by violence) does not justify a state's refusal to recognize that government.¹⁴ In general, American practice has accorded with the principle enunciated by Jefferson in 1793:

We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own Government is founded -- that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will;. . . . The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.¹⁵

Nevertheless, in American practice there have been significant departures from this principle. In 1907 and 1923, treaties were signed between the five Central American Republics instituting the "Tobar Doctrine" (so named after its originator, Dr. Tobar, the former Foreign Minister of Ecuador) which stated that any regime that obtained power through non-constitutional -- i.e., revolutionary -- means should not be recognized. Although the United States was not a signatory to these treaties, it supported fully the principle which they embodied. In addition, the United States government, under President Wilson, withheld recognition in 1913 from the Huerta Government of Mexico (which had obtained power through assassination) in an attempt to isolate and bring about the defeat of that government. Wilson also refused to extend recognition to the Tinoco government of Costa Rica on the basis of unconstitutionality.¹⁶ Similarly, the Soviet government was refused recognition by the United States government from 1917 to 1933 partly because of its revolutionary origin.¹⁷

This policy, often referred to as the "Wilsonian policy" of non-recognition was based on the doctrine of

legitimacy which holds that the legality of the new state or government is based upon "its compliance with the established legal order of that country" rather than its de facto control of the territory.¹⁸ Such a policy is not supported by international law because a change of government "is intrinsically a matter solely and exclusively of domestic concern",¹⁹ and "to examine the constitutional legality of the government of another State constitutes an intervention in the domestic affairs of that State."²⁰ Furthermore, the rule of legitimacy has been rendered obsolete by the revolutionary backgrounds of the majority of states.²¹

In 1953, President Eisenhower indicated that the United States had reverted to a Jeffersonian interpretation of considering origin to be an irrelevant factor in the extension of diplomatic recognition: "Any nation's right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable. . . . Any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible."²²

The ability and willingness of a new government to fulfill its international obligations has been posited by certain states, including the United States, as an additional basis for granting or withholding recognition. It

may be assumed that if a government fulfills the primary conditions for recognition -- effectiveness -- it will at the same time generally possess the ability to carry out its international obligations.²³ Oppenheim rejects the requirement of willingness as a condition of recognition,²⁴ and Chen considers it irrelevant because, "since the international obligations are the obligations of the State, the new government has no option but to fulfil them."²⁵

Despite the "doubtful juridicial soundness" and the "controversial practical value" of such a test, Lauterpacht observes that the application of this test constitutes a uniform feature of the practice of some States, in particular of the United States."²⁶ Accordingly, the United States' original refusal to grant recognition to the Soviet government was, to a significant degree, also determined by that government's repudiation of its international obligations, as well as its revolutionary origins.

It is generally agreed that the government of the CPR has established effective control over the territory in its possession and has obtained at least the passive acquiescence of the bulk of the population. However, it cannot as easily be shown that China has demonstrated a willingness to undertake its international obligations.

Assuming -- as the United States government does -- that this is a valid objection, the Communist government is, according to the relevant literature on international law, nonetheless eligible for de facto recognition. Recognition de facto is granted "when, in the opinion of the recognizing State, notwithstanding the presence of the principal condition of recognition, namely, that of effectiveness, there are absent other conditions of recognition, which, in the opinion of the State in question, are required by international law."²⁷ The British government's recognition of the Soviet regime illustrates the application of this principle. Recognition de facto was granted to the new government in 1921. However, recognition de jure was delayed until 1924.

The reason, generally adduced, for the refusal of de jure recognition was the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to give assurances as to the fulfillment of its international obligations with regard to the liabilities of its predecessors and its own conduct in such matters as confiscation of foreign property and revolutionary propaganda abroad.²⁸

Further, recognition de facto of the government of the CPR would in no way imply agreement to the CPR's claims regarding Taiwan and the Pescadores. Such recognition is specifically limited to mean that "in relation to State activities in areas under the effective territorial control of the new entity, it is entitled to be treated as a subject of international law."²⁹ Thus, the CPR could be

recognized solely as the government of the territory it effectively controlled -- the Chinese mainland.

Official government statements illustrate the American interpretation of the theoretical principles of international law pertaining to recognition. In 1954, Walter McConaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, recounted the legal criteria for recognition which the United States government considered essential:

(1) effective control over the territory of the country; (2) sovereign independence; (3) truly representative character -- something in the nature of a mandate from the people governed, or at least their consent without coercion; and (4) acceptance of its inherited and generally recognized treaty and other international obligations. . . .³⁰

In contrast to the universal agreement among international legal authorities upon the overriding importance of the first criterion, McConaughy stated, "of these four criteria it would seem that the Peking regime meets only the first and that is perhaps the least essential of the four."³¹

Four years later, a Department of State release put forth the following justification of the government's policy:

[T]here is reason to doubt that even by the tests often cited in international law the Chinese Communist regime qualifies for diplomatic recognition.

It does not rule all China, and there is a substantial force in being which contests its claim to do so.³²

Such an argument fails to distinguish between recognition of the CPR's government as (1) the government of the territory which it does in fact effectively control and as (2) the government of the territory to which it lays claim but does not control -- Taiwan, the Pescadores and certain offshore islands.

The Stimson Doctrine has also been invoked to justify the American policy of non-recognition. According to this doctrine, states ought to withhold recognition when any territorial change is effected by the aggression of another state. Thus, territory seized by an aggressor should not be recognized as the territory of the aggressor; nor should a "puppet state" established by such aggression be recognized as an independent state.³³

On November 26, 1949, the Nationalist government of China attempted to invoke the Stimson Doctrine in the United Nations, claiming that the government of the CPR was a Soviet puppet and had attained power as a result of Soviet aggression. The United Nations agreed that the Soviet Union had violated treaties with China, but it considered the Stimson Doctrine to be inapplicable since the Communist success was attributable to self-determination

of the Chinese populace rather than to Soviet aggression.³⁴ It appears, therefore, that the Stimson Doctrine is irrelevant to consideration of the issue of recognition of China.

Although it is not strictly an official government opinion, the following argument put forth by Senator William F. Knowland in 1957 is worthy of examination because it typifies the introduction of political and other factors into what is often presented as a discussion of the legal factors involved in recognition. Knowland states that there are four considerations which have governed United States recognition policy: (1) national interest; (2) the willingness of the new government to discharge its international obligations; (3) approval of the form of government of a new State; and (4) the new government was deemed to be in effective control of the State and its machinery.³⁵ No provision is made for granting any significance to the first and third criteria either by the principles of international law or by the bulk of American precedent. The usual application of the Jeffersonian principle -- whereby recognition is granted to an effective government representing the "will of the nation" -- has precluded consideration of such factors as national interest and approval in the majority of instances.

It has previously been suggested that the failure of a new government to fulfill the second condition -- i.e., willingness to undertake international obligations -- in no way prevents the granting of de facto recognition. Concerning the fourth, and most important, criterion, Knowland states that , "[i]nasmuch as Communist China does not control all of Chinese territory, that is to say Taiwan and the adjacent islands, it can only be said to be in control of a great portion of Chinese territory."³⁶ Further, he adds that "Nationalist China has a government and lays claim to all of the territory which can properly be described as China."³⁷ From these statements, he concludes that "from a juridical standpoint, China is still in a state of civil war with neither side having been able to gain complete control of all of China's territory."³⁸ Whether or not Knowland's conclusion is accurate, the CPR is, according to general practice in international law, nonetheless entitled to recognition de facto as the government of Mainland China.

If rival governments in one and the same country struggle for power, it may well happen that, at one stage, another State may have to grant de facto recognition to the government contending with that hitherto recognised de jure. This means in effect that the authority of each is recognised but only in relation to the territories under its effective control.³⁹

It would thus appear undeniable that the government

of the CPR is eligible for recognition de facto from existing states. That is, neither the body of international law generally nor the bulk of American precedent provides any impediment to the extension of recognition de facto to the government of the CPR. However, of the leading authorities on international law, Lauterpacht alone suggests that there is a duty to recognize a new government which is eligible for recognition. He maintains that "when that government enjoys, with a reasonable prospect of permanency, the habitual and -- though this is controversial -- willing obedience of the bulk of the population, outside States are under a legal duty to recognise it in that capacity."⁴⁰ This view he characterizes as the legal view, and he considers the dissenting opinion of the other legal authorities to comprise the political or diplomatic view of recognition. However, the view of, for example, Chen and Schwarzenberger, are not based merely on a legitimization of political expediency. Chen believes that, because "any act of recognition" is "the expression of the intention to enter into political relations" with a new government or state, "it must consequently be in the nature of a 'free act'".⁴¹

The United States has justified its policy of non-recognition on the basis that the principles of international law permit a state to recognize a new government at

its own discretion. Justification for this attitude is provided by Schwarzenberger's statement that if a new government "wishes to be recognised as a subject of international law, existing subjects are free to make their recognition dependent on any condition they see fit to lay down."⁴²

The preceding discussion suggests that the government of the CPR has indisputably fulfilled the prerequisites usually considered to be necessary for recognition de facto by existing states. However (except presumably in the judgment of Lauterpacht) the United States is not violating any principles of international law by refusing recognition to the CPR.

It also appears evident that the American policy of non-recognition is based on extra-legal, i.e., political and moral, considerations. In particular, the United States has considered non-recognition to be in its national interest. In 1949, prior to the ultimate consolidation of Communist power, John Foster Dulles remarked that the establishment of a non-Communist government was "in the national interest" of the United States and he hoped that the Chinese Communists would encounter "insurmountable obstacles" in their attempt to gain control.⁴³ It is possible that the United States conceived of its policy of non-recognition as "an insurmountable obstacle" to the

establishment of Communist control, and, later, to the continuance of the Communist regime. Nine years later, an official press release stated: "The United States holds the view that communism's rule in China is not permanent and that it one day will pass. By withholding diplomatic recognition it seeks to hasten that passing."⁴⁴ At that time, it was specified that government policy "proceeds from the conviction that such recognition would produce no tangible benefits to the United States or to the free world as a whole and would be of material assistance to Chinese Communist attempts to extend Communist dominion throughout Asia."⁴⁵

Dulles' belief that "the national interest" is an overriding consideration in the decision to grant or withhold diplomatic recognition is also evident in the following official statement. Dulles expressed support for the policy of considering the de facto government to be the legitimate government and termed it a "sound general policy". "However," he added, "where it does not serve our interests, we are free to vary from it."⁴⁶ In this and other pronouncements of policy, Dulles has made explicit the considerations underlying the government's policy of non-recognition. He has argued that "the Chinese Communist regime . . . does not live up to its international obligations,"⁴⁷ and that "political

recognition . . . would be a well nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist governments in the Far East."⁴⁸ In addition, when considering recognition, the American government is "forced to take account of the fact that the Chinese Communist regime has been consistently and viciously hostile to the United States."⁴⁹ It may be assumed that strategic considerations have also affected government policy. Certainly continued support of the Nationalist regime on Formosa assures the United States of a strategic ally and bases from which to enact policies designed to prevent Chinese Communist expansion.

Finally, moral considerations, primarily the issue of merit -- is China "deserving" of recognition? -- and the issue of American commitments to Chiang Kai-shek and to other Asian allies, have influenced American policy. With regard to the issue of merit, the American government has been influenced by such vehemently anti-Communist groups as the "Committee of One Million". The latter opposes recognition of the CPR because of its ideology, oppression and aggression, and because of "its assumed similarity to the governments of Hitler and Mussolini."⁵⁰ The speeches of, for example, Senator Knowland are also illustrative of such an attitude; he opposes recognition on the moral grounds that whereas "the United States has been a world symbol of freedom since 1776 . . . Communist

China, by contrast, is a symbol of slavery, regimentation, and irreligion."⁵¹ Such arguments appear emotional and highly subjective; nonetheless, their effect upon government policy has been considerable.

American commitments to Taiwan are formally entrenched in the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty which commits the United States to the defense of Taiwan and Pescadores in co-operation with the Republic of China. Although de facto recognition of the CPR would not necessitate abandonment of this commitment, certain segments of the American public -- represented by the China Lobby, a group dominated by loyalty to Chiang and the Nationalists -- equate recognition with the disavowal of such a commitment.

An additional moral consideration has been the fear that recognition would signify approval of the Communist regime, thus resulting in a loss of morale not only in Taiwan, but also among Asian allies and neutrals (and, as members of the China Lobby believe,⁵² among the mainland Chinese -- awaiting the return of Chiang).

In summary, the CPR appears to have undeniably met the conditions necessary for the extension of recognition de facto: the Communist regime has established effective control over the Chinese mainland; it enjoys a reasonable prospect of permanence; and it receives at least the

passive acquiescence of the populace. Official American statements available fail to provide a clear-cut argument for non-recognition on legal grounds. Instead, American policy is based upon a general disapproval of the CPR: its revolutionary origin, its authoritarian form of government, its virulent anti-Americanism and its disavowal of international obligations. It is these factors -- ideological, political and moral -- which have determined the United States' policy of non-recognition.

FOOTNOTES

¹"The principal legal disabilities of an unrecognized State or Government may be enumerated as follows:

(a) It cannot sue in the Courts of a State which has not recognized it. . . .

(b) . . . [T]he acts of an unrecognized State or Government will not generally be given in the courts of a non-recognising State the effect customary according to the rules of 'comity'.

(c) Its representatives cannot claim immunity from legal process.

(d) Property due to a State whose Government is unrecognized may actually be recovered by the representatives of the regime which has been overthrown.

Recognition transmutes these disabilities into the full status of a sovereign State or Government." J. G. Starke, An Introduction to International Law, 6th edition (London: Butterworths, 1967), pp. 144-145.

²Philip M. Brown, "The Legal Effects of Recognition", American Journal of International Law, XLIV (1950), 620. Such an interpretation is, of course, highly subjective. Certainly not all international lawyers would concur with his opinion. H. Lauterpacht, for example, who believes that there is a legal duty to recognize a new state or government which fulfils the requirements of recognition, states that "recognition is not primarily a manifestation of national policy but the fulfilment of an international duty". Moreover, he believes that this view "is in accordance with the weight of the practice of governments, with decisions of courts, and, in particular, with the requirements of international intercourse". H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1947), p. 63. (Emphasis added). See also L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, I, 8th edition, ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Longman, Green and Company, 1955), p. 131.

³See Chapter V below.

⁴Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of Recognition, ed. by L.C. Green (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1951), p. 8.

⁵Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, I, 4th edition (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960), 49. There are, however, exceptions to even this basic condition. For example, the United States recognized the Czechoslovak National Council in 1918 as a de facto belligerent government which exercised effective control over the armed forces but not over its territory. And, in 1941, the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile under Dr. Benes was recognized by the British despite its inability to exercise effective control over its territory because of enemy occupation. See Lauterpacht, Recognition, pp. 91-92; fn., p. 164; p. 334; fn., pp. 334-335.

Also, within a year of its establishment, Israel had been recognized de facto or de jure by over 40 states "despite the non-demarcation of its frontiers." Chen, Recognition, p. 56; see also p. 58.

⁶Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 125.

⁷Letter from Secretary of State Jefferson to Governor Morris, November 7, 1792, cited by John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), 120.

⁸Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 126.

⁹R. C. Byrd, "Should the United States Change its China Policy?", Congressional Record, Senate, 86th Congress, 1st session, vol. CV, part 8 (June 8, 1959), 10131.

¹⁰Chen, Recognition, pp. 123-124.

¹¹Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 127.

¹²Letter from Secretary of State Hughes to Mr. Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, July 19, 1923, cited by Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), 178.

¹³Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 92. See also Taft's ruling in the Tinoco Arbitration, fn. 20 below.

¹⁴Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 132-133.

¹⁵Letter from Jefferson to Morris, March 12, 1793, cited by Moore, Digest, p. 120.

¹⁶Chen, Recognition, p. 113.

¹⁷Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 106. The United States also withheld recognition from the Soviet Union for more strictly political reasons, primarily because of the latter's "refusal to sanction the loans and contracts made by previous Russian governments with the United States and its nationals", and because of "its refusal to extend to American citizens in Russia the type of protection customarily extended to aliens in the other countries of Europe." Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd edition (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950), pp. 723-724.

¹⁸Chen, Recognition, pp. 105, 108.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 112.

²⁰Ibid., p. 111. More specifically, in the Tinoco Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica in 1923, Chief Justice Taft found that the revolutionary origin of a government did not constitute grounds for non-recognition. L. C. Green, International Law Through the Cases, 2nd edition (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1959), pp. 84-91.

²¹Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 105.

²²Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Chance for Peace", United States, Department of State, Bulletin (hereinafter cited as U.S., Bulletin), XXVIII (April 27, 1953), 599. This policy is in accordance with the domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter, Article 2 (7).

²³Chen, for example, states that "[t]he ability to fulfil international obligations must be considered as implied in the ability to govern". Chen, Recognition, p. 125. See also Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 112.

²⁴Oppenheim, International Law, pp. 132-133.

²⁵Chen, Recognition, p. 125.

²⁶Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 113.

²⁷Ibid., p. 338. It has also been stated that "wielding effective power in the territory under its control" is a sufficient condition for de facto recognition in Oppenheim, International Law, p. 135.

²⁸Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 339.

²⁹Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 65.

³⁰Walter P. McCaughy, "China in the Shadow of Communism", U.S., Bulletin, XXX (January 11, 1954), 40.

³¹Ibid.

³²"United States Policy on Nonrecognition of Communist China", U.S., Bulletin, XXXIX (September 8, 1958), p. 388.

³³This interpretation of the Stimson Doctrine is presented by Quincy Wright, "The Status of Communist China", Journal of International Affairs, XI (1957), 180. Although the Stimson Doctrine does not specifically, in its original wording, refer to aggression per se, Wright's interpretation is supported by the following considerations.

The relevant portion of the Stimson Doctrine is as follows: "[The American Government] does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. . . ." Note from Secretary of State Stimson to the Governments of China and Japan, January 7, 1932, cited by Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 58.

The signatories to the Pact of Paris stated that "they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and [they] renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Article I, Briand-Kellogg Pact, cited by Herbert W. Briggs, The Law of Nations, 2nd edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 968.

Similarly, during this period, the United States adhered to the Anti-War Pact of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of October 10, 1933. The signatories stated that they would "not recognize any territorial arrangement which is not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of an occupation or acquisition of territory that may be brought about by force." (Article II) cited by Langer,

Seizure of Territory, p. 76.

Langer has also pointed out that the League of Nations, "obviously influenced" by the Stimson note, officially linked non-recognition to the non-aggression clause (Article 10) of the Covenant: "no change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought about in disregard of this article ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by the Members of the League." Note from the League Council to the Government of Japan, February 16, 1932, cited by Langer, Seizure of Territory, pp. 61-62.

Moreover, Goodspeed has concluded that the League actually adopted the Stimson Doctrine, and this, "in effect, signified the refusal of the League to recognize a change in a legal situation engineered by force in contravention to treaty obligations." Stephen S. Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International Organization, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 55.

³⁴United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1951), pp. 381-385.

³⁵William F. Knowland, "The United States Should Not Recognize Communist China", Journal of International Affairs, XI (1957), 165.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 68. In addition, Lauterpacht believes that, in the case of a civil war, "[i]t is not contrary to international law to recognise the insurgents as a government exercising de facto authority over the territory under its control. . . ." Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 294.

⁴⁰Lauterpacht, Recognition, p. 88. See also, Lauterpacht, "Recognition of Governments: One of the Crucial Issues of International Law", The Times, January 6, 1950, p. 5.

⁴¹Chen, Recognition, p. 129. And, in response to Lauterpacht's article in The Times, January 6, 1950, Schwarzenberger states "there is no such thing as a 'right' to recognise, and every State is entitled to grant or

withhold the recognition . . . upon grounds of policy which must necessarily be determined by itself." Letter to the Editor, The Times, January 9, 1950, p. 5.

⁴²Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 49.

⁴³Michael A. Guhin, "The United States and the Chinese People's Republic: The Non-Recognition Policy Reviewed", International Affairs (London), XLV (January, 1969), 54.

⁴⁴"United States Policy on Nonrecognition of Communist China", p. 389.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶John Foster Dulles, "The Threat of a Red Asia", U.S., Bulletin, XXX (April 12, 1954), 540.

⁴⁷John Foster Dulles, "Our Policies Toward Communism in China", U.S., Bulletin, XXXVII (July 15, 1957), 94.

⁴⁸John Foster Dulles, "Policy for the Far East", U.S., Bulletin, XXXIX (December 22, 1958), 992.

⁴⁹Dulles, "The Threat of a Red Asia", p. 540.

⁵⁰Wright, "The Status of Communist China", p. 173.

⁵¹Knowland, "The United States Should Not Recognize Communist China", p. 168.

⁵²Wright, "The Status of Communist China", p. 175. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has also stated: "If the Republic of China should be liquidated, it would extinguish a beacon of hope for millions of mainland Chinese." Walter S. Robertson, "U.S. China Policy", U.S., Bulletin, XL (April 6, 1959), 475.

CHAPTER III

CANADIAN RECOGNITION POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Official Canadian pronouncements on the issue of recognition of China have, on the whole, differed significantly from those of the American government. However, as in the United States, the formation of the Canadian policy of non-recognition has not been based purely upon a consideration of legal factors.

On October 1, 1949, the newly established People's Republic of China invited recognition from foreign governments on the "basis of equality, friendship, respect for territorial integrity and withdrawal of recognition from the national government."¹ Accordingly, the question was discussed in the House of Commons on October 25, 1949. Lester Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, specified at this time that Canadian policy with regard to recognition of the Chinese Communist regime would take into consideration the usual requirements of international law. To be eligible for recognition, he stated, a government "must be shown to be independent of external control by any other state; it must exercise effective control over the territory which it claims, and that territory must be reasonably well-defined."² Pearson added that "[i]f and

when these requirements are met, . . . consideration should be given to the recognition of a government in China or in any other part of the world."³

At this time, then, it appeared that the Canadian government was willing to recognize the government of the CPR on the basis of that government's fulfillment of the criteria usually regarded as essential for the extension of legal recognition. The moral and ideological factors which influenced and indeed appear to have determined the American decision not to recognize China appear to have been absent from the Canadian government's assessment of the situation.

However, on November 16, 1949, Pearson posited two additional criteria which he believed the government of the CPR should fulfill in order to be eligible for recognition. That government should be "able to discharge its international obligations" and it should be "accepted by the Chinese people."⁴ These two conditions do not appear to be identical to similar conditions set forth by the United States government. First, Pearson mentioned the ability, rather than the willingness, of the government to undertake its international obligations. It was suggested in Chapter II above that generally a government need only be effective in order to possess the ability to fulfill these obligations. Also, Pearson, in contrast to American

government spokesmen, did not qualify the criterion of acceptability by the Chinese people by any requirement of popular demonstration.

Again, Pearson indicated that Canadian recognition would follow the Chinese government's fulfillment of these criteria. If it were established that the Peking government was effective, independent, accepted by the populace and able to discharge its international obligations, then, Pearson said, "[we will] have to recognize the facts which confront us."⁵ He was careful to specify that recognition was the acknowledgement of an existing state of affairs and that it did "not imply or signify moral approval."⁶ To these comments, the Secretary of State added the qualification that recognition would follow "consultation with other friendly governments."⁷ This suggests that, in addition to the consideration of legal criteria, Canada's decision would be influenced both by Britain and certain Commonwealth members which soon after recognized the CPR, and by the United States which did not. The inability of Canada to formulate a policy in concert with both its Commonwealth and American allies was considered by Pearson to complicate the question of recognition -- a question which was considered by the government throughout the latter part of 1949 and the early part of 1950.⁸

In March 1950, Pearson indicated that considerations other than legal criteria would affect Canadian policy.

In connection with China we are dealing at this time only with recognition of a new government, not recognition of a new State. In deciding whether recognition should or should not be given to a new government certain criteria . . . have been laid down by authorities on international law, such as Oppenheimer [sic], Brierly, Jessup, Lauterpacht and others. But these conditions of course, have never been, and were never meant to be, applied rigidly and without exception.⁹

Thus the Canadian government was prepared to exercise a certain amount of latitude in interpreting the legal criteria relating to recognition; further, it was likely that extra-legal considerations would be taken into account.

Once more, Pearson set forth the previously mentioned legal criteria. At this time, he specified that the CPR should be willing, as well as able, to discharge its international obligations. However, he indicated that the Canadian government's position on this point was flexible; he commented that were this condition to be applied too rigorously and too exactly, "we might today be recognizing the government of Mr. Kerensky in Moscow."¹⁰ With regard to the acquiescence of the Chinese populace, Mr. Pearson stated that he concurred with the opinion of Lauterpacht -- "acceptability does not necessarily mean now acceptability by . . . 'freely expressed popular approval'."¹¹ In accordance with this interpretation,

Canada had recognized the Franco regime in Spain in 1939 -- a government which controlled the population but which had never actually demonstrated the existence of popular support.

It is perhaps instructive at this point to cite a few examples of Canadian recognition of other governments¹² and to examine the statements of government spokesmen relating to recognition on a theoretical level. It may then be possible to determine whether or not Canadian precedent provides justification for recognition of the CPR.

De facto recognition was granted to the State of Israel and to its provisional government in 1948. At that time, the Secretary of State for External Affairs specified that Israel had, "in the opinion of the Canadian Government, given satisfactory proof that it complies with the essential conditions of statehood . . . [which] are generally recognized to be external independence and effective internal government within a reasonably well-defined territory."¹³

In 1963, the Canadian government extended recognition to the government of the Republic of Viet Nam. Paul Martin, Secretary of State, presented to the House of Commons the conditions that the Canadian government considered before extending recognition: "[t]he fact

that the government is in actual control of the major part of the territory of the state, it has undertaken to observe international obligations entered into by its predecessors, and it has secured the acquiescence of the population."¹⁴

On the whole, the Canadian government appears to have taken a more objective approach to the question of recognition than the United States. That is, it has considered the effectiveness of a government, rather than, for example, its ideology or method of attaining power, to be the primary determinant of its eligibility for recognition. As Secretary of State Martin commented: "With regard to the recognition of a government we would want to bear in mind the durability of tenure of the government itself. If this were apparent, all other things being considered equal we would extend de facto recognition. The question of de jure recognition would follow."¹⁵ Martin has also characterized Canadian practice thus: ". . . where there is no special consideration, the practice followed by Canada is to deal with the government that is in control. It is not for a Canadian government to decide whether any particular government is the right one for a country to have."¹⁶ Canada had, for example, recognized Mongolia and Albania -- two countries "with which we do not have any ideological community of interests."¹⁷

The foregoing comments suggest that Canadian recognition of the CPR would not constitute a break with the practice usually followed by the government. Further, Pearson's comments concerning recognition suggest that the government was, prior to the Korean War, considering extending recognition primarily, although not solely, on the basis of the CPR's fulfillment of the criteria posited by international legal authorities.

Chester Ronning, the Canadian representative in China during 1949 has stated that in October 1949, "there was no doubt in the minds of Nanking's diplomatic corps that the criterion for recognition had been adequately met."¹⁸ The assumption that the CPR had fulfilled the traditional requirements for recognition was strengthened, he believes, by the decision of the American government to authorize its Ambassador, Leighton Stewart, to remain in Nanking after the Nationalist Government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, had fled to Canton.¹⁹ In the United States, Secretary of State Dean Acheson specified that recognition of any government, even "a new and perhaps militaristic government," would be considered after it becomes possible to determine that the government "really controls its territory."²⁰ Although he was referring primarily to the recognition of Latin American governments, China scholars have inferred from the timing of his speech and its

general, rather than specific terms, that his comments were also relevant to the question of Chinese recognition.²¹

As the Canadian government cautiously considered extending recognition, it simultaneously undertook discussions with the American and Commonwealth governments. Ronning has stated that consultation with Commonwealth members resulted in an informal agreement "that recognition of the regime was inevitable and that each member of the Commonwealth would decide the appropriate time to make an announcement of its own decision."²² India recognized the new regime on December 26, 1949; Britain, on January 6, 1950. Ronning has commented that "Canada hoped to follow the United Kingdom, probably before the end of January."²³

Canada's decision was delayed by the United States' hesitance in forming a policy and by Peking's failure to reciprocate the recognition extended by Britain. Ronning, representing Canada, was authorized to discuss reciprocation of recognition with Peking. In order to avoid embarrassment similar to that which Britain experienced, he suggested that negotiations should be undertaken between Ottawa and Peking prior to public announcement of recognition. Both countries would then make simultaneous announcements of an exchange of ambassadors after

discussion of "all relevant issues".²⁴ Chou En-lai, negotiating for CPR, agreed. Before Ottawa had made a final decision, the Korean War erupted and the issue was dropped. In 1951, Pearson stated that until the end of the Korean War there could be no question of even considering recognition of the CPR.²⁵

After the Korean War, it became evident that the question of Peking's willingness to honour its international obligations had become an obstacle to the Canadian extension of recognition. In 1954, Pearson specified that despite the evident effectiveness and independence of the CPR's government, "unless and until there is some evidence of a genuine disposition to follow the rules of acceptable international behaviour, the Chinese Communist Government has no claim to our formal recognition."²⁶ In order not to preclude future possible recognition, Pearson added that the traditional policy of Canada has been to recognize, if it were in the national interest, "certain Communist and other totalitarian regimes whose domestic and foreign policies are not more to our liking than those of Peking."²⁷ Further, he added, ". . . we cannot ignore one very important fact. When problems arise which directly concern China, we have now to deal with the government which is in effective control of the Chinese mainland. . . . In order to find a solution to the

problem of peace in the Far East we have to accept the fact of Communist power in China, just as we accept that fact in the Soviet Union."²⁸

In the following year, Pearson indicated that the Peking government's attitude toward its international obligations generally had perhaps changed. He characterized the behaviour of the CPR as "less aggressive, less threatening". It appeared that the Canadian government did not wish to apply too stringent an interpretation of the requirement that a government fulfill its international obligations; Pearson cautioned against adopting "the position where we seem to be demanding positive proof of utter purity from this or any other regime before we could consider giving it formal diplomatic recognition."²⁹

Although Pearson continued to emphasize the necessity for a flexible position toward the subject of recognition, extra-legal factors increasingly appeared to replace legal criteria as the determinants of Canadian policy. In 1956, Pearson stated that the question of recognition involved "a careful balancing of many national and international factors, moral, political and economic."³⁰ Specifically, any decision to extend recognition "remains predominantly a political one to be taken on the basis of enlightened self-interest, as in many other cases where we have recognized totalitarian regimes."³¹

Such a decision was also influenced by the necessity "to give consideration to the interests and views of our friends and allies."³² In addition, moral factors were, for the first time, introduced by the Liberal government. "There are, of course," Pearson told the House of Commons, "moral considerations involved and, in the case of a ruthless communist regime, these considerations inevitably must have a bearing on our attitude."³³

A brief examination of statements by Conservative spokesmen -- both before and during the period that that party formed the government -- indicates that moral factors have dominated consideration of the question of recognition to a far greater extent than in the case of the Liberal party.

In 1950, George Drew, leader of the Opposition, stated that recognition should be considered in the light of "what recognition means to the Chinese, to the Russians, and to those countries in southeast Asia which are still doing all they can to hold the vile flood of communism from their countries." He believed that "recognition of China would be regarded almost as a fatal blow to the government of Viet Nam which we have recognized."³⁴

Several statements of policy concerning recognition were issued during the period that the Conservative

government held office. In 1959, Sidney Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated that the government of the CPR had fulfilled the usual legal requirements of effectiveness and control of the obedience of the population; further, it had fulfilled its international obligations "to at least the same extent as some governments which we do recognize now and about whose political systems we have the same kind of reservations."³⁵ Nevertheless, Smith believed that the granting of recognition should be delayed because of the effect that recognition might have upon the overseas Chinese in southeast Asia and, particularly, upon the ability and disposition of the non-communist countries in Asia to resist Peking's influence.³⁶ His comment that Canadian recognition might "give rise to a misinterpretation of our attitude [toward Communist China] in the countries of Asia" suggests that Smith was concerned lest recognition be interpreted as Canadian approval of communism.³⁷

A similar attitude was expressed by Secretary of State Howard Green the following year. He stated that the Peking government should not be recognized because "[f]undamentally, . . . we believe it would be letting down our friends in that part of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia. . . ."³⁸

The Conservative government also considered

Peking's international behaviour to constitute a barrier to Canadian recognition. Thus Prime Minister John Diefenbaker informed the House of Commons, "until such time as the people's government, the communist government of China, expiates its wrongdoing under international law there certainly will be no justification for the granting of recognition. . . ." ³⁹

Although the Conservative Government placed greater emphasis upon moral factors, both Conservative and Liberal governments -- at least since the mid-1950's -- have considered non-legal factors to be relevant in any decision to grant or withhold recognition. This assumption is strengthened by statements by both Conservative and Liberal governments. In 1959, Smith specified that "any government which has fulfilled the legal requirements is [not] automatically entitled to recognition. This is a decision that should only be taken on the basis of national and international interests." ⁴⁰ Earlier, Pearson had stated, "[l]egal recognition is . . . something you give for your own national advantage in your own national interest. . . ." ⁴¹

Thus, unlike the American government, the Canadian government by late 1950 clearly accepted the fact that the CPR had fulfilled the primary legal requirements for recognition: effectiveness, independence of external

control, and the general acceptance of the population. The origin of the government (revolutionary rather than constitutional) was not viewed as a deterrent to the extension of recognition. Peking's involvement in the Korean War prevented Canada from considering recognition; however, by 1955, Pearson believed that Peking's international behaviour had improved and that the criterion of requiring a government to honour its international obligations should not be applied too stringently.⁴²

It appears then that the fulfillment of legal conditions has been considered by the Canadian government to constitute only a prerequisite to recognition. It is probable that recognition would be withheld if a government were unable to meet these legal conditions; however, once these conditions were met, consideration of recognition has been based on other, non-legal factors. The primary factors which have influenced the Canadian government on this issue appear to be the impact of public opinion, internally, and externally, the influence of the United States government -- either directly or indirectly.

FOOTNOTES

¹Canada, House of Commons Debates, November 16, 1949, Second Session, Vol. II, p. 1838.

²Debates, October 25, 1949, Second Session, Vol. II, p. 1109. These requirements accord with those set forth by authorities on international law. See, for example, Schwarzenberger, Manual, p. 49; Lauterpacht, Recognition, pp. 26-30.

³Debates, October 25, 1949, Second Session, Vol. II, p. 1109.

⁴Debates, November 16, 1949, Second Session, Vol. II, p. 1838.

⁵Ibid., p. 1839.

⁶Ibid., p. 1838. Pearson's statement reflects the government's disposition to adhere to the declaratory or de facto doctrine of recognition whereby recognition is an acknowledgment of the existence of an effective government. The recognizing government "does not pass judgment upon the form or origin of that government; nor [are] . . . questions of ideology and the like . . . taken into account." Chen, Recognition, p. 117.

⁷Debates, November 16, 1949, Second Session, Vol. II, p. 1838.

⁸Debates, March 7, 1950, Vol. I, p. 514.

⁹Ibid., p. 515.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 516.

¹¹Ibid., emphasis added.

¹²Because Canada did not independently recognize foreign governments and states prior to the Statute of Westminster in 1931, there is a very small body of Canadian precedent on recognition.

¹³"De Facto Recognition of the State of Israel", External Affairs, I (January, 1949), 30. Recognition was granted despite the Canadian government's awareness "that the boundaries of the new State have not as yet been precisely defined. . . ." Ibid.

¹⁴Debates, November 14, 1963, Vol. V, p. 4721.

¹⁵Debates, April 2, 1964, Vol. II, p. 1714.

¹⁶Debates, September 22, 1964, Vol. VIII, p. 8285.

¹⁷Debates, April 2, 1964, Vol. II, p. 1714.

¹⁸Chester Ronning, "Nanking: 1950", International Journal, XXII (Summer, 1967), 442.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Dean Acheson, "Waging Peace in the Americas", United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XXI (September 26, 1949), 463-464.

²¹For example, Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, ed. by A. Doak Barnett (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), p. 110.

²²Ronning, "Nanking: 1950", p. 443.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 444.

²⁵"External Affairs in Parliament; statement of Government Policy", External Affairs, III (June, 1951), 203. In 1959, Pearson, as Leader of the Opposition, remarked that "the events in Korea which made recognition out of the question up to a few years ago no longer have much bearing on this particular problem." Debates, February 26, 1959, Vol. II, p. 1415.

²⁶"Should Canada Recognize Red China? [Statement by Secretary of State Pearson]", Statements and Speeches, No. 54/49.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹"Excerpts from an Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Women's Canadian Club, Vancouver, B. C., August 25, 1955 ", Statements and Speeches, No. 55/30.

³⁰Debates, January 31, 1956, Vol. I, p. 710.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid. The impact of this latter factor is discussed in Chapter V below.

³³Debates, January 31, 1956, Vol. I, p. 710.

³⁴Debates, March 3, 1950, Vol. I, p. 462. In fact, at this time Canada had not recognized Viet Nam. Pearson, Debates, March 7, 1950, Vol. I, p. 517.

³⁵Debates, February 26, 1959, Vol. II, p. 1405.

³⁶Ibid., p. 1407.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Debates, February 10, 1960, Vol. I, pp. 937-938.

³⁹Debates, November 1, 1957, 1957-1958 Session, Vol. I, p. 654. This statement provided no indication of when justification for the extension of recognition would exist. Diefenbaker failed to specify both what constituted China's "wrongdoing under international law" and how it was to be expiated.

⁴⁰Debates, February 26, 1959, Vol. II, p. 1406.

⁴¹Debates, March 31, 1954, 1953-1954 Session, Vol. IV, p. 3544.

⁴²However, the American and Canadian policies toward recognition are similar inasmuch as both governments have

specified that considerations of the "national interest" is a vital factor in the extension of recognition.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIETAL FACTORS -- PUBLIC OPINION

Rosenau has characterized the societal set of variables as "those nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its external behavior."¹ Although public opinion comprises only one element of this set, on the issue of Canadian recognition of China, public opinion appears to constitute the most significant indicator of societal influences.

Studies of public opinion in Canada are, however, virtually non-existent. Little research has been conducted to determine the direction of public opinion on specific issues; further, no attempt has been made to assess the relationship between public opinion generally and the decision-making process in Canada. The available data concerning the attitudes of the public toward recognition of China consist primarily of the results of three surveys conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) in 1959, 1964, and 1966 containing specific questions regarding recognition of China; editorial opinion; and the statements of representatives of interest groups and those organizations (business, religious, etc.) which have considered this issue. It is, therefore,

impossible to obtain an accurate assessment of the attitude of the Canadian public toward recognition of China from 1949 to the present; moreover, the impact which opinion has exerted upon the formation of government policy cannot easily be determined.

Because of these limitations, only the most tentative conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the existing data. In order to determine the relationship between public opinion and policy in Canada, it is necessary to examine the theoretical literature which does exist -- most of which is based upon studies of the American political system. It is of course impossible to assert that the findings of American studies on public opinion and political participation are necessarily relevant within the Canadian political setting. Accordingly, only the most general and well-confirmed theoretical findings will be considered; those conclusions based on Canadian studies which do exist will also be presented. Further, several of the most basic assumptions are supported by the findings of The Civic Culture, a multicultural study.² The fact that the findings drawn from this study were applicable to all five nations (two of which were Anglo-Saxon cultures, the United States and Great Britain) suggests that they are so general and indeed transnational that they would be also applicable to Canada.

For the purposes of this study, public opinion will be defined as "any collection of individual opinions."³ In examining the nature of public opinion in Canada toward China, the focus will be upon the specific publics which hold an opinion on this issue, the direction and intensity of opinion, and the impact of the opinion upon policy formation.

The extent to which public opinion influences policy formation in a democracy varies from issue to issue; generally, it functions as a restraining or negative force rather than as a positive impetus to action. The impact of public opinion upon the behaviour of decision-makers in an open society appears to consist primarily in its ability to establish broad limits to potential policy decisions. V. O. Key, for example, views government "as operating within a matrix of opinion, a matrix that establishes vague limits of permissiveness within which governmental action may occur without arousing a commotion."⁴ Because "officials are generally reluctant to take a stand in the face of probable widespread, popular disapproval," the government attends to the direction and intensity of public opinion on a particular issue in order to obtain "a rather widespread knowledge of its [the public's] tolerances."⁵

To a certain degree, public opinion also influences

government policy in a positive sense. In a study of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decisions in Canada, Jerome Laulicht states that "public opinion can and does affect government policy but . . . the 'public' is not a unity, nor are all segments equally influential."⁶ It is fruitful, therefore, to consider the issue of public opinion toward China with reference to the opinions of different publics, rather than to assume that there exists a mass sentiment of equal intensity and potential influence distributed evenly throughout the nation.

The public as a whole appears to be composed of a series of layers arranged hierarchically, which constitutes the mass public, the attentive public, and the elites. These three strata differ primarily in terms of their knowledge of foreign policy issues, their levels of education and occupation, and the relative influence of their opinions upon government policy.

The nature and role of interest groups will be considered separately as they possess characteristics of both the elites and the attentive public.⁷ In terms of information and ability to communicate their opinions to government, they more closely approximate the elites. However, they do not necessarily occupy institutional

positions as do elites (although, of course, in many cases they do); also, their influence upon policy formation is probably considerably less than that exerted by elites. In these respects, interest groups more closely resemble the attentive public.

The elites, which constitute the most influential group, may be defined as those persons who hold leadership positions in the economic, political and bureaucratic spheres. Snyder and Furness have characterized these elites as opinion-leaders because of their role in influencing, articulating, and representing the opinions of the mass public; in addition, "they have various types of access to the policy-making process and the policy-makers."⁸

Within the Canadian political setting, elites are able to perform the role of opinion-leaders "[t]hrough occupancy of positions which give them access to special knowledge and through the esteem in which they are held. . . ."⁹ In addition, elites may participate directly in policy formation either because they are government members also representing the interests of certain groups, for example, business, agriculture, or labour, or because they are asked by political parties or the government "to give their expert advice on the solution to some vexing problem."¹⁰ To those elites which are not directly involved in policy formation, the following channels of

communication between them and the government exist: "personal contacts, informal meetings, conferences and writing -- letters, scholarly and journalistic articles, books and briefs."¹¹

In contrast to the relatively powerful elite which comprises a very small portion of the total public, the mass public, constituting the largest segment of society, is, generally, apathetic, inert and powerless. On the whole, this group is characterized by low levels of information, influence and participation. These factors, in turn, appear to be a function of low educational, occupational, and status attainment. Studies of the relationship between social factors and knowledge and opinions about foreign policy "tend to support the hypothesis that among the poorly-educated, lower income manual workers, the sense of involvement in public, and particularly international, affairs tends to be extremely limited and passive."¹² The basic apathy of "a large sector of the lower income, poorly educated majority of the population" is due, at least in part, to the fact that "[i]ts intellectual horizon tends to be quite limited, and its analytical skill is rudimentary."¹³

Because this group is largely uninformed, without initiative, and lacking structured opinions, it "lies virtually outside the opinion-policy relationship."¹⁴

Further, because the mass public generally lacks both the ability and the motivation to engage in political participation, its influence upon the formation of governmental decisions is minimal. On the basis of these considerations, the following observation by Laulicht relating to Canadian public opinion appears justified.

[O]n such abstract issues as foreign policy, it seems reasonable to suppose that the relatively poorly informed and poorly educated citizenry only sporadically constitutes an important pressure on the government. Therefore, these groups are viewed as having the least influence.¹⁵

Between the elites and the mass public lies the attentive public, a relatively small group which is both "aware of major issues and well-informed with respect to them"; in contrast to the opinions held by the mass public, their opinions possess "structure and depth".¹⁶ In terms of actual participation, Rosenau hypothesizes that they engage in discussion and debate of foreign policy issues; a substantial number frequently write to decision-makers or "[engage] in other forms of amateur opinion-submitting"; and, presumably, they comprise the active membership of voluntary associations."¹⁷

Within the context of the Canadian opinion-policy relationship, Laulicht has posited the existence of an Informed Public -- analogous to the attentive public.

This group consists of those persons "who do not hold institutional leadership positions, but who are the kinds of people with whom political leaders have the most contact between elections."¹⁸ His description of the composition of this group and its participation and influence on policy follows.

When politicians talk about sounding out the public pulse or checking 'with the voters', this is the group they probably mean. They are the educated middle-class people who write to their representatives, who meet them at public and informal gatherings, who write to editors, who are community leaders -- who are articulate and concerned enough with political issues for government to have a rather accurate picture of their views. The Informed Public is assumed to have medium influence on government; less than the elite groups (how much less is a moot point), but considerably more than other parts of the general public.¹⁹

The higher degree of information and influence possessed by the elite in contrast to both the mass and attentive publics is obviously a function of the roles occupied by the elites. No similar distinction necessarily exists between the mass and attentive publics. Rather, the available data on public opinion suggest that the substantially higher level of information, influence and participation exhibited by the members of the attentive rather than the mass public is, above all, a function of the level of education attained. "One of the most consistent findings of social science is that, in general, the more education a person has, the more likely he is to

follow the course of events and engage in attentive citizenship."²⁰ Mildred Schwartz has also suggested that increased education "results in increased information, . . . sensitizes individuals to available sources of knowledge, . . . is associated with greater use of communication media [and] . . . leads to skill in handling new and difficult ideas."²¹

Higher education has also been associated with increased political participation, a belief in the ability to influence policy formation (sense of political efficacy), and a feeling of obligation to participate politically (sense of citizen duty).²² Peter Regenstreif has observed that in Canada, "[t]he more educated a person is, the more likely he is to be motivated to participate in politics at all levels, to feel that he can influence public affairs, and to try to affect the course of events by assuming an opinion-leader role."²³ These factors tend to reinforce one another,²⁴ and, together with increased information, explain why the attentive public appears to exert an impact upon governmental policy which is disproportionate to its size.

The attentive public also differs from the mass public in that members of the former group generally hold higher occupational positions. Persons of higher

occupational status "are more likely to participate in politics,"²⁵ and to possess more political information.²⁶ However, because the university educated group "is concentrated among the upper- and middle-income groups and among persons carrying on professional or executive occupations,"²⁷ it is likely that the higher levels of participation and information exhibited by persons in higher occupational positions is at least partly related to their educational level. Yet it seems reasonable to suppose that, in addition to the influence of higher education, those in higher occupational positions possess the resources necessary to attend to foreign policy issues and participate politically. Conversely, members of lower occupational groups are possibly more concerned with day-to-day bread and butter issues and with satisfying basic demands such as food, shelter, etc. Further, members of professional, managerial and other "white-collar" jobs usually possess verbal skills which facilitate the expression of opinions and encourage political involvement.

In 1959, 1964, and 1966, a small representative national sample (658, 694, and 696 persons respectively) was asked to express an opinion in response to the following question: "Do you think Canada should or should not recognize the Communist government in China, that is, appoint an ambassador to China, and have dealings with

that government?" The responses were as follows:²⁸

Response:	1959		1964		1966	
	%	(#)	%	(#)	%	(#)
Yes, should recognize	32	(209)	51	(352)	55	(385)
No, should not	44	(287)	33	(233)	27	(191)
No opinion	<u>24</u>	<u>(162)</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>(109)</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>(120)</u>
TOTAL	100	(658)	100	(694)	99	(696)

The survey results illustrate that the public, as a whole, has increasingly favored recognition during this period. In addition to determining the respondent's opinion on Canadian recognition of the CPR, the 1959 survey asked respondents if they knew whether Britain and the United States had recognized China. It is possible, therefore, to isolate an "informed group" composed of those respondents who were able to answer both questions correctly. The opinions of this "informed group" are presented below and compared with the opinions of the national sample.

Response:	National Sample		Informed Group	
	%	(#)	%	(#)
Yes, should recognize	32	(209)	55	(103)
No, should not	44	(287)	32	(61)
No opinion	<u>24</u>	<u>(162)</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>(25)</u>
TOTAL	100	(658)	100	(189)

This breakdown of respondents illustrates that there was a much higher percentage in favour of recognition among the "informed group" than among the national sample as a

whole. In addition, fewer respondents in the former group were unable or unwilling to offer an opinion on this issue. An "informed group" cannot be isolated from the 1964 and 1966 data. Hence, the hypothesis which the 1959 data suggests -- that the opinion of the respondent is related to his level of knowledge on that issue -- cannot be confirmed.

It is possible, however, to construct a profile of the attentive public from each of the surveys -- primarily on the basis of educational and occupational levels, and, to a lesser degree, on socio-economic status. It has been suggested that members of the attentive public appear to constitute a foreign policy "audience" to which governmental decision-makers are particularly attentive. The opinions of this group are based on relatively high levels of information. In contrast to the mass public, members of the attentive public articulate their views and frequently participate politically in an attempt to effect the translation of their opinions into policy. If the policy of the Canadian government toward China has been influenced by public opinion, it would seem that it is primarily the views of the attentive public which the government has considered.

In order to isolate the members of the attentive public, the data for the 1959, 1964 and 1966 surveys has

been analyzed in terms of education, occupation, and socioeconomic group; these characteristics have then been correlated with the direction of opinion on this issue. It should be possible therefore to assess the opinions of the attentive public toward recognition and to determine whether or not it differs from the opinion held by the public as a whole. The respondents' opinions have also been determined on the basis of religion, region and party preference. However, because these factors are not relevant in differentiating members of the attentive and mass publics, the tables cross-tabulating opinion with religion, region and party preference are presented in Appendix I rather than in the body of this Chapter.

Education appears to be associated with a favourable attitude toward recognition of China. When the opinions of the respondents of the national groups for each year were distributed according to levels of education (see Table II) the percentage of respondents in favour of recognition rose consistently with the level of education attained. In all three years, the percentage of respondents with a university education favouring recognition greatly exceeded the national average in favour. The opinions of the respondents with secondary education most closely approximated the national averages; those respondents with only public school education consistently

TABLE II

EDUCATION

Levels of Education

1959:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National Sample</u>	<u>Public School (1-8)</u>	<u>Secondary (9-12)</u>	<u>University</u>	<u>No Formal School</u>
Yes	32%	21%	37%	48%	
No	43	45	44	40	(2)
No opin- ion	<u>25</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>12</u>	(3)
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	
N	658	269	315	69	5

1964:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National Sample</u>	<u>Public School</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Univ.</u>	<u>Tech.</u>	<u>None</u>
Yes	51%	40%	54%	72%	45%	(1)
No	33	40	32	17	38	
No opin- ion	<u>16</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>17</u>	(1)
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	
N	694	247	335	78	29	2

*3 respondents refused to answer

1966:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National Sample</u>	<u>Public School</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Univ.</u>	<u>Tech.</u>	<u>None</u>
Yes	55%	44%	56%	76%	66%	(1)
No	27	32	27	18	27	
No opin- ion	<u>17</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	(1)
TOTAL	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
N	696	234	326	89	45	2

advocated recognition to a degree far less than the national average.

In addition, the ability or willingness of the respondent to express an opinion appears to be associated with the level of education attained. The percentage of "no opinion" respondents consistently ranges from a lower to a higher level as the educational level of each group increases. This finding is supported by a multitude of studies dealing with public opinion and education. "One proposition is incontrovertible: namely, extent of education has a good deal to do with the probability that a person has an opinion."²⁹

An analysis of the data also reveals an apparent association between the occupational level of the respondent and his opinion. Occupations were ranged along a continuum from "Professional" through "Executive, Manager, Owner", "Sales", "Clerical, other White Collar", "Skilled Labour", to "Unskilled Labour" (see Table III). The remaining classifications listed in the Table ("Farmer", "Homemaker", "Retired or Pensioned", "Unemployed", "Military", and "Student" are considered to be separate categories which cannot be ranked meaningfully in relation to the others.

Table III demonstrates that the higher the

TABLE III - OCCUPATION

1959:

Opinion	National	Profes- sional	Executive Manager, Owner	Sales	Clerical, Other White Collar	Skilled Labour	Unskilled Labour
Yes	32%	44%	38%	38%	36%	32%	27%
No	43	51	43	34	45	46	35
No opin- ion	25	4	19	28	18	22	38
TOTAL	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
N	658	45	79	29	66	181	96

1964:

Yes	51%	81%	61%	55%	51%	47%	38%
No	33	11	26	37	37	35	45
No opin- ion	16	8	13	8	12	18	17
TOTAL	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
N	694	52	77	38	73	195	87

1966:

Yes	55%	76%	74%	72%	60%	49%	38%
No	27	16	18	24	28	29	35
No opin- ion	17	8	8	3	12	22	27
TOTAL	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
N	696	51	83	29	82	206	86

*7 respondents refused to answer for 1959; 5 for 1964; and 3 for 1966.

TABLE III (Continued)

1959:	<u>Farmer</u>	<u>Homemaker</u>	<u>Retired, Pensioned</u>	<u>Unemployed</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Student</u>
	21%	14%	33%	(1)	(2)	-
	43	45	50	(1)	-	-
	36	41	17	(2)	-	-
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>			
	81	22	46	4	2	-
1964:						
	47%	31%	54%	(2)	(3)	(1)
	34	37	31	(5)	-	-
	18	31	15	(1)	(1)	-
	<u>99%</u>	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>			
	76	19	59	8	4	1
1966:						
	52%	55%	45%	(3)	-	(4)
	30	27	38	-	-	(1)
	17	18	17	(3)	(1)	(1)
	<u>99%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>			
	63	22	58	6	1	6

*7 respondents refused to answer for 1959; 5 for 1966; and 3 for 1966.

occupational level of the respondent, the more likely he is to favour recognition. In each year, the percentage of respondents in favour of recognition was highest in the highest income and status occupation -- professional -- and decreased consistently through each occupational level down through the lowest -- unskilled labour. Further, the responses in favour of recognition by members of "white collar" occupations (those categories other than unskilled and skilled labour) equalled or exceeded the national average in all years.

There does not appear to be a definite relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and direction of opinion on this issue (see Table IV). However, it is difficult to determine whether or not the method of classification utilized by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion provides a valid measure of SES. The CIPO Centre states that respondents are classified into SES groups by an "[i]nterviewer rating based on criteria such as size, type, and nature of home, furnishings in the home, respondent's position in the community, etc." The subjective nature of this measure -- based solely on the interviewer's assessment of status, and unvalidated by any "re-check" -- casts doubt upon its usefulness.

The data does suggest that respondents in the

TABLE IV

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP

1959:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>
Yes	32%	32%	36%	32%	19%
No	43	37	48	42	41
No opinion	<u>25</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
N	658	19	168	391	80

1964:

Yes	51%	54%	56%	52%	31%
No	33	23	30	33	49
No opinion	<u>16</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	694	26	192	392	84

1966:

Yes	55%	71%	67%	51%	45%
No	27	14	21	31	31
No opinion	<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>23</u>
TOTAL	99%	99%	100%	100%	99%
N	696	35	172	403	86

SES Index: A - upper
 B - upper-middle
 C - middle
 D - lower-middle

upper and upper-middle groupings are most in favour of recognition. In each year, the percentage of respondents favouring recognition in these two categories equals or exceeds both the national average and the number of respondents in the two lower groups. Further, the lower-middle status group contains far fewer respondents in favour of recognition than any other category in all three years. However, because of the nature of measuring SES in these surveys, it is difficult to assess the degree to which socio-economic status is associated with the direction of opinion on this issue.

As these three surveys constitute the only available data relating to the Canadian public's attitude toward recognition, the findings presented here are, of course, inconclusive and, at best, tentative. Nevertheless, it would appear that the attitude of the attentive public toward recognition of China differs markedly from the attitude held by the public as a whole. Members of the former group favour recognition to a far greater degree; further, a greater number of the attentive public hold an opinion on this issue.

The general lack of public opinion research in Canada prevents an accurate assessment of the influence of the attentive public upon the decision-making process. It is assumed, however, that members of this group could

be expected to articulate their opinions and participate at a higher level and to a greater degree than members of the mass public; i.e., it is the former rather than the latter group which functions in the policy-opinion process. Were the government to base its decision to recognize or withhold recognition from the CPR on the basis of an assessment of public opinion, it is, therefore, the opinions of the attentive public which would influence the government.

There is very little organized data concerning the attitudes of elites in Canada toward China. The most valuable study is Paul and Laulicht's In Your Opinion, which is based on an analysis of surveys conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute. One of the purposes of this study was to determine and compare the attitudes of various groupings of the public toward communism generally. Business, labour and political leaders were asked whether they favoured (1) Canadian grain sales to China, and (2) admission of that country to the United Nations. Their opinions were then compared to the responses of a National Sample. Their findings are particularly valuable inasmuch as the study contrasts the opinions of economic and political elites with those of the mass public. Further, it is probable that opinion on trade and admission are related to opinion on recognition. However, as there is

no evidence to suggest the nature or intensity of such an association, if indeed one exists, the results of the study are presented in Appendix II.

The opinions held by organized interest groups in Canada also provide an indicator of the direction of public opinion toward recognition. Engelmann and Schwartz have defined interest groups as "organizations designed to present such attitudes as are shared by the group."³⁰ The articulation of these attitudes is directed towards affecting governmental policy. Thus it would appear that any interest group which considered recognition of China to be a salient issue and advocated Canadian recognition would be attempting to influence government policy on this issue.

In "Canadian Attitudes to Communist China", Maureen Appel canvassed several interest groups in order to obtain a cross-section of Canadian associations. The following discussion of the opinions of various interest groups is based primarily on her findings.³¹

In Canada there is no strong, organized group analogous to the powerful American China Lobby which vehemently opposes recognition. The only evidence of organized interest group protest toward recognition appears to be the existence of a pamphlet entitled "Should Canada

Recognize Red China?" printed under the auspices of the Canadian Loyalist Movement and distributed by the "Committee of One Million".³²

The organized interest groups which Appel surveyed represent economic, religious and social action organizations. Most business associations appear to view Canadian relations with China almost exclusively in economic terms. Those associations which have specifically advocated trade with China include the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Studebaker-Packard and Canadian General Electric. In addition, "British Columbia firms such as MacMillan-Bloedel and Powell River (lumber), airline companies, and port grain handlers were prepared to do -- indeed, anxiously awaited -- business with Mao's regime."³³ On the whole, these companies have not addressed themselves to the specific question of recognition. However, Appel has hypothesized that "since commercial groups favour Sino-Canadian trade for individual, as well as domestic economic reasons, they would support Canadian recognition of Peking if it would ease or increase this trade."³⁴ The Canadian Junior Chamber of Commerce has specifically advocated "recognition of the Government of Mainland China in the interest of free trade."³⁵ Also, J. V. Clyne of MacMillan-Bloedel has "urged the Canadian government to recognize Peking thereby greatly facilitating

Sino-Canadian commerce."³⁶

Appel observed that, in general, the Canadian banking community has adopted "a neutral to tepid position on the China issue."³⁷ However, James Muir, late President of the Royal Bank of Canada, favoured recognition on the basis that it would further Sino-Canadian trade; moreover, he considered recognition of Peking to be inevitable.³⁸

The Canadian labour unions which have expressed views on the issue of recognition "condemn government equivocation and urge positive diplomatic action."³⁹ These unions include the Canadian Labour Congress, the Canadian Division of the United Steel Workers of America, and the Ontario Federation of Labour.

As early as April 1950, the Department of External Affairs reported that "on balance, the majority of the numerous Canadian church groups and churchmen who express views on the subject, appear to support Canadian recognition of Communist China."⁴⁰ The United Church of Canada, the Canadian Mennonite Church, the Unitarian Church, and the Anglican Church have specifically advocated recognition.⁴¹ In 1964, in response to the French recognition of the CPR, officials of the United and Anglican churches publicly urged the Canadian government

to follow suit on the basis that the policy of non-recognition was "short-sighted and incongruous."⁴²

The Roman Catholic Church has not officially expressed an opinion on the issue of recognition. However, the Knights of Columbus -- an organization affiliated with that Church -- and Relations, a Jesuit publication, have strongly and consistently opposed Canadian recognition.⁴³

Those social action interest groups which Appel canvassed -- the Voice of Women, the World Federalist Association, and the Canadian Peace Congress -- have strongly and publicly favoured recognition.⁴⁴

On the basis of the data collected, Appel has concluded that "the great majority of Canadian interest groups which have considered the China issue advocate . . . positive Canadian action."⁴⁵ The opinions of these interest groups may be transmitted to the government through a variety of channels. For example, associations such as the Canadian Federation of Agriculture and the Canadian Labour Congress maintain contact with relevant government departments. Organized interest groups may also submit briefs to the federal Cabinet or individual government representatives, and publish resolutions enunciating their opinions.⁴⁶ It is evident, therefore, that

the government is cognizant of the opinions of those interest groups which have formulated attitudes toward Canadian recognition of the CPR.

Editorial opinion also provides a measure of public opinion. In the linkage between public opinion and governmental policy, the role of the editorial opinion appears to consist both in reflecting existing public opinion and in attempting to influence both public opinion and government policy.⁴⁷

On the whole, editorial opinion has favoured Canadian recognition of China. Editorials in the Toronto Globe and Mail, the newspaper with the widest circulation in Canada, have consistently advocated recognition.⁴⁸ According to this newspaper, "[r]ecognition of Communist China is nothing more than diplomatic acknowledgement of [the] fact . . . that the Peking Government is in control of mainland China."⁴⁹ Recognition need not be coupled with support for admission of China into the United Nations; indeed, the Globe and Mail has stated that the CPR should not be admitted to the United Nations until "the Peking Government shows itself genuinely desirous of peace."⁵⁰ Because the two issues could be considered separately, the Globe and Mail has expressed the opinion that "Canada should recognize the Peking regime immediately."⁵¹

When France extended diplomatic recognition to China in 1964, the Ottawa Citizen stated that the Canadian government should also recognize the CPR. Because substantial Sino-Canadian trade existed and was likely to increase, the Citizen suggested that "Canada has at least as much reason as France to recognize the Peking regime."⁵² Also, the Citizen believed that the realities of international politics rendered recognition inevitable.

The day cannot be far off when the Peking regime will obtain China's seat in the United Nations General Assembly. . . . At such a time, to continue to refuse diplomatic recognition to Peking would become wholly absurd. Recognition may as well be extended before that stage is reached.⁵³

Le Devoir, the major French-speaking newspaper in Canada, favoured recognition primarily because it believed that the Canadian policy toward China reflected a lack of independence vis-à-vis the United States on foreign policy issues.

Que les États-Unis modifient leur attitude et s'apprêtent à reconnaître le gouvernement de la Chine continentale, et on verra le Canada "se faire une opinion" en l'espace de 24 heures. Car telle semble devenue la marge de notre indépendance réelle dans les questions vraiment importantes.⁵⁴

As early as January 1950, Saturday Night, a Canadian magazine with nation-wide circulation, advocated recognition of China. "[T]oo great a delay in recognizing the new Government in China would be an error for Canada,

and would do no good to anybody in China."⁵⁵

Finally, in 1960 Fred Alexander conducted a subjective study to determine Canadian attitudes on a variety of foreign policy issues. With regard to public opinion toward China, he made the following observation.

Of the extent of Canadian disapproval of the policy which the State Department and White House had followed in recent years in their dealings with Peking, I can report dogmatically and with conviction. The prevailing Canadian view was that US policy was unrealistic, excessively ideological and dangerously emotive. This applies to American policy generally regarding China. . . . There was no denying the strength of the feeling of Canadians on this point.⁵⁶

Indeed, Trevor Lloyd, referring to the mood of the general public between 1957 and 1959 (the years with which his book, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959, is concerned), has observed that "[o]utside Parliament, support for recognition and admission was widespread."⁵⁷ He attributes this favourable attitude to the following factors.

[Q]uite apart from those who were anti-American there were people who felt that the realities of power should be accepted in the field of diplomacy, or who wanted to work towards more normal relations between East and West, or hoped for more trade as a result of recognition.⁵⁸

The results of the CIPO surveys indicate that the public as a whole has increasingly favoured recognition during the 1959-1966 time period. In each year, moreover,

the number of members of the attentive public -- which is considered to constitute the most articulate and influential group -- who favoured recognition has exceeded the number of those opposed. If pressure from "the public" has been exerted upon the government in either direction, it has more likely been encouraged to recognize China by the most active members of the general public -- the attentive public.

Generally, recognition has not become a salient issue for most Canadian individuals or groups. However, those who have considered the issue -- certain interest groups and business associations and various newspapers -- have overwhelmingly favoured recognition. Because they have articulated their opinions, either publicly or directly to the government, the latter is surely cognizant of their views. Moreover, organized or influential opposition toward the issue does not appear to have ever existed. Thus, the evidence suggests that the Canadian government cannot have been deterred from extending recognition by adverse public opinion.

FOOTNOTES

¹Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 43.

²The Civic Culture is a study of the political culture of democracy based on over 5,000 interviews with respondents of five democratic nations. "It describes the political beliefs, aspirations, emotions, and actual participation in politics of citizens in five countries -- Germany, Italy, Mexico, Great Britain, and the United States." Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. viii.

³Harwood L. Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation and Role (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 14.

⁴V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 282.

⁵Childs, Public Opinion, p. 318.

⁶Jerome Laulicht, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Decisions", Journal of Peace Research, II (1965), p. 159.

⁷See below, pp. 63-64.

⁸Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1954), p. 525.

⁹Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967), p. 77.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 83.

¹¹Ibid., p. 81.

¹²Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), p. 128.

¹³Ibid., p. 130 (emphasis added).

¹⁴James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 36.

¹⁵Laulicht, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Decisions", p. 149.

¹⁶Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 40.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Laulicht, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Decisions", p. 149.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰James N. Rosenau, The American Public and Foreign Policy (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, March, 1968), p. 14.

²¹Mildred A. Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 222. See also Key, Public Opinion, p. 342, and Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 317.

²²Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 134, 318-319; Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), pp. 57, 63, 122; Schwartz, Public Opinion, p. 222; Key, Public Opinion, pp. 324-329.

²³Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude: Parties and Voting in Canada (Toronto: Longman's Canada, Ltd., 1965), p. 89.

²⁴Rosenau, The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy, p. 20.

²⁵Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 124.

²⁶Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, p. 124.

²⁷Ibid., p. 127.

²⁸The card decks for CIPO surveys were obtained from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts. The dates of the surveys and their numbers are as follows: May 1959: No. 275; February 1964: No. 306; October 1966: No. 321.

²⁹Key, Public Opinion, p. 332. See also Schwartz, Public Opinion, p. 222.

³⁰Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, p. 93.

³¹Maureen Appel, "Canadian Attitudes to Communist China" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of McGill, 1964). Written permission was obtained from the author to quote from her study.

³²The federal Social Credit party, although it is not, strictly speaking, an interest group as defined in this study, has also consistently opposed Canadian recognition of China. (Indeed, it has, on the whole, opposed dealings with Communist nations generally.) See, for example, statements in the House of Commons by Mr. Low, Debates, March 3, 1950, Vol. I, p. 441, and March 21, 1952, Vol. I, p. 693; by Mr. Patterson, Debates, August 1, 1956, Vol. VII, pp. 6805-6806; and by Mr. Thompson, Debates, May 22, 1964, Vol. IV, pp. 3503-3504.

³³Appel, "Canadian Attitudes to Communist China", p. 161.

³⁴Ibid., p. 162.

³⁵Resolution, National Convention, 1959. Contained in a letter from B. J. Stefaniuk, Executive Director, October 16, 1963 to Maureen Appel, cited by Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 157.

³⁶Winnipeg Free Press, May 29, 1959, cited by Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 161.

³⁷ Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 164.

³⁸ Annual Report of the Royal Bank of Canada, 1958 (Montreal), p. 15, cited by Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 164.

³⁹ Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 165.

⁴⁰ Montreal Star, April 13, 1950, cited by Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 167.

⁴¹ Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", pp. 168-170.

⁴² Ibid., p. 170.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 171-173.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 173-176. These groups are classified as social action interest groups on the basis of the taxonomy presented by Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties, p. 96. Although they do not distinguish between social action and ideological interest groups, the term "social action" appears to be sufficiently inclusive to describe those groups considered here.

⁴⁵ Appel, "Canadian Attitudes", p. 176.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 177.

⁴⁷ There has actually been no research conducted in Canada to suggest the nature of the relationship between editorial opinion and government policy. Hence the impact which editorial opinion has exerted upon government policy toward China can be only roughly estimated. Further, this examination of editorial opinion was based on the holdings of the University of Alberta library and is not necessarily representative of editorial opinion generally.

⁴⁸ Editorials in the Globe and Mail dealing with the question of Canadian recognition were examined randomly up to 1969.

⁴⁹ Editorial, Globe and Mail, July 7, 1954.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Editorial, Globe and Mail, February 2, 1956.

⁵²Editorial, Ottawa Citizen, January 28, 1964.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Editorial, Le Devoir, February 3, 1956.

⁵⁵Editorial, Saturday Night, January 17, 1950.

⁵⁶Fred Alexander, Canadians and Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 129.

⁵⁷Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 177.

⁵⁸Ibid.

CHAPTER V

SYSTEMIC FACTORS -- INFLUENCE BY THE UNITED STATES

In 1949, Secretary of State Pearson announced before the House of Commons that Canada would consider extending diplomatic recognition if it became evident that China had fulfilled the legal requirements of effective and independent control over its territory.¹ By 1950, it was clear that the CPR had indeed fulfilled these conditions and Pearson stated that the matter was "now before the government for consideration."² However, despite repeated indications that this and succeeding administrations were seriously considering the issue, no formal announcement of the government's intention to recognize China was made until May 29, 1968.

What factors deterred the Canadian government from extending diplomatic recognition? The evidence presented in the preceding Chapter is of such an admittedly limited nature that only a crude assessment of the impact of public opinion on the issue of recognition could be made. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Canadian government's policy of non-recognition was formulated as a response to adverse public opinion, i.e., to strong societal pressures. In this Chapter, an attempt will be made

to assess the strength of systemic factors -- those "non-human aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by officials."³ Because the primary systemic factor on this issue appears to be the influence exerted by the United States, the extent of the American influence upon the Canadian government's China policy will now be examined.

Canada is necessarily associated with the United States on a variety of issues -- political, economic, and military. In a very broad sense, Canada's major foreign policy goals coincide with those of the United States. For example, R. St. J. Macdonald has postulated that Canada's major foreign policy objectives include the survival and security of the nation, the maintenance of international peace, the establishment of the rule of law in international relations, and the establishment of democratic forms of government internationally.⁴ Because of this coincidence of interests, and because certain of Canada's goals, e.g., security, cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the United States, maintenance of good relations with the United States is, in itself, a major objective of Canadian foreign policy. It is fruitful, therefore, to consider the American influence on Canada's China policy within the broader framework of

Canadian-American interaction. Indeed, as John Holmes has remarked, "[t]he dilemma of the Canadian government is that Canada's China policy is inextricably involved with Canada's general relations with the United States."⁵

The magnitude of the interaction between the two countries imposes limits upon the independence of Canadian foreign policy. To a degree, Canada has consciously chosen to sacrifice a certain measure of independent action; for instance, Canada has voluntarily participated in such joint defence endeavours as NORAD, and, economically, has sought to attract American foreign capital to Canada. Moreover, because this interaction has been characterized primarily by Canadian dependence on the United States rather than by mutual Canadian-American interdependence, the maintenance of good relations between the two countries is particularly essential to Canada. As Macdonald has observed, "[g]ood relations with the United States are more important than good relations with any other power, or group of powers . . . because the United States can injure Canada, even unintentionally, more easily and extensively than any other country. . . ."⁶ For this reason, Canada "dare not lightly test her ability to sustain serious and protracted disagreements with the Americans."⁷

Instances of the actual use of power by the United States in Canadian-American relations are rare; however, the

potential ability of the United States to exert pressure upon the Canadian government means in effect that the formulation of Canadian policy on specific issues is to a large degree influenced by a consideration of the likely response of the United States to Canadian policy decisions.

A brief examination of Canadian dependence upon the United States for the defence of its territory exemplifies the extent and nature of Canadian-American interaction. Prior to the Second World War, North America's relative isolation from traditional areas of conflict, viz., Europe and Asia, enabled Canada and the United States to pursue separate defence policies. During World War II, military co-operation developed and was formalized by the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 1940. This agreement announced the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which initiated Canadian-American interdependence. After the War, the development of the long-range bomber and atomic weapons, together with the emergence of the Cold War, redefined Canada's strategic position in the world. Canada's geographical location -- directly below the air-route between the Soviet Union and the United States -- rendered the defence of Canadian territory a vital concern of both American and Canadian security policy. This factor, coupled with the economic and technological inability of Canada to defend its territory

adequately, necessitated the development of military interdependence. Accordingly, North America increasingly came to be regarded by both countries as a single unit for defence purposes.

The Soviet attainment of an atomic long-range capability in the early 1950's resulted in the construction of three chains of radar stations, primarily in Canadian territory, in 1954 and 1955 to detect approaching enemy aircraft from the north. (These were the Pine Tree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning Line.) Defence co-ordination was furthered by the establishment of an integrated Canadian-American Air Defence Headquarters in 1957 -- the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). The function of NORAD was "to achieve operational coordination of North American air defences and to provide machinery for joint planning."⁸ The following year, the Cabinet Committee on Joint Defence was created -- composed of the American Secretaries of Defence, State and Treasury, and the Canadian Ministers of National Defence, External Affairs and Finance. This committee was established in order to provide a high level forum of an advisory nature to consider defence policy.

Melvin Conant has concluded that the relatively limited role of Canada within NORAD necessitated a loss of Canadian independence on defence matters.

As a practical matter, it was understood fully in Ottawa and Washington that the control of the continental air defence systems had passed to the United States and the decisions for utilizing assigned forces, wherever located, would not be made in Canada.⁹

The independence of Canadian foreign policy has also been limited by Canadian-American interaction in the economic sphere. Economic interaction between Canada and the United States is characterized primarily by an imbalance of trade and widespread American investment in the Canadian economy.

Trade between the United States and Canada is extensive; in fact, "the two countries are each other's best customers."¹⁰ In 1966, Canada's exports to the United States constituted 59.9 per cent of its total domestic exports; imports from the United States in that year comprised 72.3 per cent of total Canadian imports.¹¹ In comparison, 21.9 per cent of American exports were to Canada and 23.9 per cent of American imports were from Canada.¹² Not only is the greatest part of Canada's trade with the United States but the Canadian economy is far less self-sufficient than the American economy. (For example, in 1966, total exports accounted for 17.4 per cent of Canada's gross national product;¹³ in contrast, in the United States, exports accounted for only 4.0 per cent of that country's GNP.)¹⁴ Hence, Canada is vastly

more dependent upon continued economic intercourse between the two nations than is the United States.

In 1968, the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry was commissioned by the Canadian government to examine the nature and extent of foreign control of Canadian industry. This report, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, revealed that the magnitude of American investment in Canada was the result of several interrelated factors.

The rising importance of direct investment relative to portfolio investment in international capital movements, the growing dominance of the United States in the world economy generally and vis-a-vis Canada in particular, and the depletion of resources within the United States . . . pulled Canada increasingly into the American orbit. The requirements of an expanding American economy combined with strategic considerations to increase sharply American demand for a range of Canadian resources, with market access and capital availability often facilitating American rather than Canadian ownership and control. The growth of the Canadian economy, partly consequent on external demand for resources, meant an expansion of the Canadian market, in terms of both population and standard of living, which promoted new opportunities for foreign as well as domestic entrepreneurs.¹⁵

Thus certain conditions have encouraged American investment in Canada; in turn, United States investment has resulted in an increase in the Canadian standard of living. These factors have reinforced one another to the extent that continued Canadian prosperity is, to a significant degree, dependent upon continued American investment. The

extent of this investment is indeed great. At the end of 1965, United States investment exceeded \$23 billion; this figure represented more than three quarters of all non-resident investment in Canada.¹⁶ Tupper and Bailey have stated that "[o]ver 60 per cent of the Canadian gross national product stems from foreign investment in Canada -- and roughly 75 per cent of that foreign investment is American. Thus 45 per cent of the Canadian GNP stems from U.S. investment in Canada. . . ." ¹⁷ More specifically, the United States owns over 60 per cent of the Canadian oil and gas industry; almost 60 per cent of Canada's mining and smelting interest; over 50 per cent of the chemical, electrical and farm-machinery industries; 45 per cent of all manufacturing; 35 per cent of the pulp and paper industry; 25 per cent of all railways and 13 per cent of the utilities in Canada.¹⁸ In addition, by 1961, American-controlled plants employed 22 per cent of Canada's labour force.¹⁹

The effects of such extensive foreign investment are political as well as economic. The Task Force observed that foreign investment leads to the integration of the economies of the host country and country of origin. "When foreign ownership becomes pervasive, as in the case of American ownership in Canada, the industrial structures become intermeshed."²⁰ Also, there is a "potential shift

outside the [host] country of the locus of some types of decision-making."²¹ The extent to which this will occur varies of course with the specific circumstances and with the relative power of the governments of the two countries involved. But "[t]o the extent decision-making is eroded, national independence -- being in a broad sense, the ability to make decisions in the national interest -- is reduced."²² The immense power of the United States relative to that of Canada and the concentration of American, rather than multi-national, investment in Canada, renders Canada particularly vulnerable to a potential loss of independence.

Canadian independence has also been threatened by the application of extra-territoriality -- "the intrusion of one country into another or the subjection of residents of one country to the laws and policies of another country."²³ It is the subsidiary of the parent company which provides the means of exercising extra-territoriality. National sovereignty of the host country is threatened when the laws of the two countries conflict. For example, the United States Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 prevents sales by American nationals to Communist China; the Canadian government restricts only the sale of specific strategic goods to that country. Thus overlapping legal jurisdiction may occur on a specific

issue if the United States believes that subsidiaries of American companies are subject to its jurisdiction and Canada maintains that its laws are applicable to resident foreign subsidiaries.²⁴

Regulations established by the Trading With the Enemy Act apply specifically to all foreign firms and subsidiaries in which Americans have actual or potential control. In the case of infringement of these regulations, the directors and shareholders of the parent company are criminally liable under the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.²⁵ Consequently, Canadian subsidiaries of American firms are deterred directly by their parent companies and indirectly by the United States government from engaging in trade with China.

The extent to which American pressure -- through application of the Trading With the Enemy Act -- has actually restricted Canadian trade to China is unclear. The most publicized case involved the potential sale to China of \$5 million worth of automobiles by the Ford Motor Company of Canada in 1958. Conflicting statements by the governments and firms involved make it difficult to determine whether actual American pressure prevented the sale, or indeed if the order was formally placed. Nevertheless, whether or not the sale was deterred by American intervention, "it is clear that Ford of Canada

declined to pursue the possibility of selling vehicles to Red China because of the U.S. parent corporation's responsibility for the prevention of such sales under the Foreign Assets Control regulations."²⁶ Gordon Churchill, the Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, denied that there was any proof of direct pressure; however, he acknowledged that "[t]here is a law in the United States supported by regulations which prohibit subsidiary companies trading with Communist China, and that law and the regulations have apparently acted as a restraint to trade on the part of Canadian subsidiaries."²⁷

Following this incident, the issue of trade with China involving Canadian subsidiaries of American firms was discussed by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker in July 1958. It was agreed that a Canadian subsidiary wishing to trade with China could ask the Canadian authorities to request specific exemption from the Foreign Assets Control regulations from the United States government.²⁸ Rather than exercising direct legal jurisdiction over the Canadian subsidiary, the United States government would in effect grant or withhold exemption from the parent company. Although this agreement provided a means of consultation on specific issues, it did not result in any substantive changes. "The United States still reserved the power unilaterally to impose its

prohibitions upon the parents of Canadian firms which receive orders from Red China."²⁹ Moreover, Safarian has made the following observation. "Little is known about the way in which this has worked, although the few known cases do not suggest it has been particularly effective in permitting exports to occur."³⁰

In 1969, Alvin Hamilton, the former Minister of Agriculture, addressed the first national convocation on United States-China relations. He specifically charged that Canadian trade with China had been hampered by American regulations. "Many of our companies are subsidiaries of American companies. They cannot move in regard to China trade because the officers of their parent companies will be prosecuted under American law."³¹ He added that several independent Canadian companies were also deterred from trading with China because they had large markets in the United States and "feared that there would be a reaction against their goods in the United States if they followed Canadian government policy and traded with China."³² (An example of this latter form of pressure occurred in 1959 when the Aluminum Company of Canada rejected the opportunity to conclude a \$1 million sale of aluminum to Peking "because the sale would upset the company's trading relationships with several American firms.")³³

Without access to confidential government documents, it is impossible to ascertain whether or not pressure has actually been exerted by the United States upon Canada concerning the latter's decision to recognize or withhold recognition from China. Pauline Jewett has stated that the possibility of "retaliation" through (legal) policies has affected the formation of Canadian policies. "[T]here have been a sufficient number of times when we feared [the] possibility that the threat of retaliation has conditioned governmental attitudes into general timidity."³⁴ She speculates that these considerations have deterred the Canadian government from extending recognition.³⁵ Whether or not this is the case, extensive economic dependence of Canada upon the United States has created a situation in which the latter nation is potentially capable of exerting political pressures upon Canadian policies through economic measures. John Holmes suggests that the realization of this situation has influenced the formation of Canadian foreign policy.

We have, of course, a permanent interest in avoiding policies which would unduly irritate Congress -- not because we fear anything so crude as sanctions on their part but because there are many issues which come before them, mainly economic, on which we hope they will take a generous view of the Canadian interest.³⁶

Moreover, insofar as the United States has deterred or

actually prevented Sino-Canadian trade, the ability of the Canadian government to pursue an independent foreign policy has been severely hampered.

In a broad sense, both Canadian and American foreign policies reflect opposition to the extension of Communist influence. However, on specific issues, such as relations with China, the views and policies of the two countries have varied significantly. Whereas the United States has favoured a policy of containment and isolation of China, Canada has generally felt that China's isolation endangers the maintenance of peace. The views of Paul Martin are indicative of the position held by the majority of Canadian government spokesmen. He has expressed the belief that "the increasing ostracism of Communist China from the world community may be self defeating and a potential threat to international stability."³⁷ While continuing to actually withhold recognition, successive Canadian governments have favoured and encouraged Sino-Canadian trade, and have repeatedly stated that eventual recognition was a distinct possibility. American policy, on the other hand, has, at least until the mid-1960's, consistently opposed any dealings with the CPR.

[T]he Korean War reinforced the views of those Americans who favoured total opposition to the new Chinese government. As a result, American policy hardened and crystallized. Opposition to the seating

of Peking's representatives in the UN became, together with the continued recognition of the Nationalist government and the refusal to recognize the Communist regime, a basic pillar of America's China policy. It has been reaffirmed by successive congressional resolutions, upheld in the platforms of the major political parties, and supported by both Democratic and Republican Presidents.³⁸

The vigour with which the United States has upheld and continued its policy and the importance which it has attached to non-recognition have led the United States to support and encourage similar policies by its allies. Although evidence of actual pressure is lacking, it may be possible to assess crudely the extent of American influence upon Canadian policy by examining statements by Canadian spokesmen which purport to explain why Canada has not recognized the CPR. Indeed, Canadian spokesmen have repeatedly stated that the question of extending recognition has undergone periodic consideration and reappraisal. Each government pronouncement has specified that the continuation of the policy of non-recognition does not preclude a future change of policy.

In 1951, a major statement of Canadian policy in the Far East was presented by Mr. Pearson, in which he expressed the belief that "the Far Eastern problems could be more readily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the Government of China, which has the whole of the mainland of China under its control."³⁹ However, he

added that the government's decision to withhold recognition at that time had been influenced by Chinese participation in the Korean War and by "advice which we had received from many quarters, to proceed very cautiously in this matter."⁴⁰ Although Pearson was somewhat vague about the nature and origin of this advice, it would appear that Canada had been advised by the United States to withhold recognition. The extent of American participation in the Korean War and the concurrent rise of public opinion in the United States hostile to the CPR certainly render it probable that the United States was the major "quarter" advocating caution. Indeed, Pearson specified that "[d]uring the past months we have had some differences of opinion with our friends in Washington on Far Eastern questions."⁴¹ Because the major part of Pearson's speech dealt with the issue of recognition, presumably these "differences of opinion" applied to the question of recognition. Pearson also stated that one of "the cardinal considerations" involved in resolving the issue of recognition was "the necessity of preserving solidarity with our friends in the West -- above all, of preserving unity of purpose and action between the United States and Canada and the Commonwealth of Nations."⁴²

In 1955, Mr. Pearson described Peking's behaviour as "less aggressive, less threatening", and advised

against "demanding positive proof of utter purity from this or any other regime" before extending diplomatic recognition.⁴³ He specified that recognition was not to be confused with approval and that the Canadian government had already recognized that the CPR's participation was vital to the success of Far Eastern negotiations. It appeared that the government was seriously considering extending recognition at this time. As the following comments by Pearson imply, however, the possible American reaction to an independent Canadian decision to recognize the CPR exerted a substantial influence on the government's decision.

[I do not wish] to indicate that we are rushing into -- or should rush into -- any change of policy in this matter of diplomatic recognition, in a way that would cause bitter controversy at home or with certain friendly nations. I am suggesting, however, that the time is coming -- and soon -- when we should have another and searching look at the problem; that we should consider it also with those friendly governments with whom we like to act -- and whenever possible should act together on matters of international importance. The greatest possible unity of the free world is always a major objective of Canadian policy.⁴⁴

Again, Pearson omitted to specify the identity of "certain friendly nations". However, because Britain and the United States are the two nations which most influence the formation of Canadian foreign policy, and because Britain had previously recognized China, it is logical to conclude that Pearson had in mind the probable response of the

United States when he referred to "bitter controversy . . . with certain friendly nations."

A "searching look at the problem" was undertaken in 1955 and early 1956 as the government seriously reassessed its position vis-à-vis recognition. Statements by Pearson (including the speech previously cited and an article published in Look Magazine, an American periodical)⁴⁵ have been interpreted as "a studied effort to prepare both Canadian and American public opinion for a major change."⁴⁶ However, on January 31, 1956, Pearson announced that the Government's policy would remain unchanged; i.e., immediate diplomatic recognition would not be extended, but the possibility of eventual recognition should not be discarded. His statement that "we are obliged to give consideration to the interests and views of our friends and allies,"⁴⁷ suggests that the attitude of the American government toward a change in policy significantly influenced the results of the Canadian government's reassessment. The government's reluctance to alter its policy was strengthened in April 1956, when, at the White Sulphur Springs Conference, the American attitude toward recognition of the CPR was explicitly presented to the Canadian delegates. Prime Minister St. Laurent later informed the House of Commons that although the Canadian position on recognition was not specifically mentioned, "both

President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles explained very frankly the reasons why recognition of the communist government at Peking could not be contemplated under present circumstances. . . ."⁴⁸

Although there is no available evidence to suggest that the United States applied or threatened to apply actual pressure in 1956 upon the Canadian government on this issue, Mr. Pearson, in an interview the next year, made the following remarks.

[The] reason we have not recognized Communist China comes from a calculated weighing of advantages and disadvantages from recognition. I am not talking about the moral aspect, but about the practical aspect -- the advantages from recognition against the disadvantages of having a first class row with the United States. . . ."⁴⁹

When asked at this time how vulnerable Canada was "to insistence by the United States on a certain amount of collaboration" on the China issue, Pearson implied that the sacrifice of independence was secondary to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries.

We're vulnerable because we want to co-operate with them, and we're willing to make some sacrifice to co-operate with them, even some sacrifice of national interest . . . because without the United States we're vulnerable before Communist imperialism in a military sense.⁵⁰

No substantial change of policy was introduced by the Conservative government. In 1958, the question of

recognition was reappraised once more, but the United States informed the Canadian government that Canadian recognition would be "detrimental" to the interests of the West and the United Nations,⁵¹ and the policy of non-recognition was continued. The pronouncement of Conservative spokesmen were basically similar to those of their predecessors. For example, Sidney Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated, in a discussion concerning relations with China, that the CPR had sufficiently fulfilled the legal requirements necessary for recognition, and that China's isolation hindered the effective functioning of international diplomacy. Canada's decision to extend diplomatic recognition, however, would continue to depend upon an "assessment of the advantages to be gained by such an act."⁵³

However, the Conservative administration introduced a new justification for withholding recognition. Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard Green believed that recognition might be interpreted as moral approval and that "were Canada to take the step of recognizing Red China at the present time", Canada "would be letting down our friends" in Asia.⁵³ A similar argument had long been prevalent in the United States but the previous Canadian administration had not emphasized it, both because "our Asian friends" have included Commonwealth

countries such as India, Pakistan and Ceylon, which have recognized the CPR, and because Liberal spokesmen had been careful to disassociate recognition and approval. In addition, Mr. Diefenbaker spoke of the necessity for "the people's government of China [to expiate] its wrongdoing under international law" before the extension of recognition could be justified.⁵⁴ Both arguments so closely paralleled those set forth by the United States to justify its policy that it is difficult to determine whether the Conservative government's views were based on an independent assessment of the situation or whether they represented actual influence by American governmental and public opinion.

The attitude of the United States continued to affect Canadian policy throughout the next Liberal administration. Secretary of State Paul Martin asserted in 1963 that although it was necessary to formulate a "realistic and far-sighted" policy toward China, "it is neither possible nor desirable that our relations should be at wide variance with those of our closest friends and allies."⁵⁵

The evidence suggests that American influence has been exerted indirectly rather than through specific pressures. The United States has opposed recognition of the

CPR and has presented its views repeatedly to the Canadian government. The latter appears to have favoured recognition in principle but it has been deterred from extending recognition by the predicted American response to a change in policy. When, then, has the present Liberal government initiated negotiations with Chinese representatives for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations? Prime Minister Trudeau stated on May 29, 1968, that the government's "aim will be to recognize the People's Republic of China government as soon as possible",⁵⁶ and negotiations between the two countries commenced on March 18, 1969.

I suggest that systemic factors still influence the determination of policy, but that the direction of these factors may have changed. It is possible that the United States now perceives that Canadian recognition of China would be advantageous to American interests. American opinion -- both official and unofficial -- has recently become more amenable to the prospect of reducing China's isolation. In a policy speech before the National Committee on United States-China relations, Senator Edward Kennedy proposed that "the United States abandon its isolationist 'war' policy toward Communist China and seek diplomatic relations" with the CPR.⁵⁷ Similarly, in 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by

Senator J. W. Fulbright, concluded that the psychological tension between the United States and China should be reduced as soon as possible. Referring to the Committee's hearings, Vice President Hubert Humphrey remarked, "We Americans must try to bring the Chinese into the community of mankind. To isolate them from the community is not in the interests of world peace."⁵⁸ In addition, Professor J. K. Fairbank, a member of the hearings, was asked about the probable American reaction to Canadian recognition. He expressed the belief that the administration would privately welcome a change in Canadian policy because it would increase Johnson's options in the Far East. Not only could the establishment of Sino-Canadian diplomatic relations provide increased channels of communication between China and the United States, but, in addition, Canadian recognition might pave the way for American recognition.⁵⁹

It is possible, therefore, that the United States may welcome a Canadian initiative to establish diplomatic relations -- an initiative which could serve as a precedent for a change in American policy. A recent interview with Mr. Trudeau strengthens the assumption that the American attitude toward China and toward Canadian recognition of China has altered. In response to the question, "do you anticipate that the United States' attitude toward the Peking Government will continue to be a

deterrent [to Canadian recognition?]," Trudeau responded, "I am quite sure that several years ago they would have reacted very badly. I am not sure that is true now."⁶⁰

Indeed, when the Canadian government announced its intention to recognize the CPR, Canadian Business made the following observation.

In fact, the feeling in Washington is that President Nixon himself consulted with the Trudeau government prior to Trudeau announcing moves toward recognizing Red China, and that Mr. Nixon gave private assurances to Ottawa that the White House not only approved of such a move but encouraged it.⁶¹

James Eayrs has also hypothesized that if Canada recognizes China, "[t]here will be those in the [US] Administration . . . who, so far from deploring the Canadian decision, will even welcome it, not only as doing the right thing so far as Canada is concerned but as making it less difficult for their own government to follow suit."⁶²

He states that whereas such opinions are "difficult to document", he has heard them expressed privately.⁶³

Thus it would appear that systemic, rather than societal, factors have exerted the greater influence upon Canadian policy toward China. Canadian-American interaction is so extensive -- politically, economically and militarily -- that the Canadian government is unable to formulate specific policies without reference to the views

of the United States. The restraints which American policies have imposed upon Canadian trade with China illustrate the extent to which the general framework of Canadian-American relations has prevented the Canadian government from pursuing an independent foreign policy. With regard to Canada's policy of non-recognition in particular, government spokesmen have consistently indicated that Canada has been deterred from extending diplomatic recognition to the CPR by the United States. Further, a change in the nature of the systemic, rather than the societal, factors appears to have been primarily responsible for the recent Canadian decision to recognize China. The United States has then, to a significant degree, affected the formation of Canadian policy.

FOOTNOTES

¹See Chapter III above.

²Canada, House of Commons, Debates, March 7, 1950, Vol. I, p. 514.

³Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 43.

⁴R. St. J. Macdonald, "Fundamentals of Canadian Foreign Policy", The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1958, ed. by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 157.

⁵John W. Holmes, "Canada and China: The Dilemmas of a Middle Power", Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, ed. by A. M. Halpern (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 117.

⁶Macdonald, "Fundamentals of Canadian Foreign Policy", p. 177.

⁷Ibid., p. 163.

⁸R. J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation", International Journal, XVII (Summer, 1962), 221.

⁹Melvin Conant, "Canada and Continental Defence: An American View", International Journal, XV (Summer, 1960), 224-225.

¹⁰Macdonald, "Fundamentals of Canadian Foreign Policy", p. 171.

¹¹Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book, 1968 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 958.

¹²Based on statistics presented in Yearbook of International Statistics, 1967 (New York: United Nations, 1969), p. 898.

¹³Based on statistics presented in Canada Year Book, 1968, pp. 957, 1064.

¹⁴Based on statistics presented in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1968, 89th edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 314, 814.

¹⁵Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), p. 16.

¹⁶Canada Year Book, 1968, p. 1086.

¹⁷Stanley R. Tupper and Douglas L. Bailey, Canada and the United States (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1967), p. 99.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Canada Year Book, 1968, p. 1087.

²⁰Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry, p. 47.

²¹Ibid., p. 27.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 310.

²⁴Ibid., p. 49.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 317-318.

²⁶Kingman Brewster, Jr., Law and United States Business in Canada, published under the auspices of the Canadian-American Committee, sponsored by the National Planning Association (USA) and the Private Planning Association of Canada, 1960, p. 24.

²⁷Debates, June 24, 1958, Vol. II, p. 1559.

²⁸ A. E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada, Ltd., 1966), p. 145.

²⁹ Brewster, Law and United States Business in Canada, p. 25.

³⁰ Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry, p. 145.

³¹ "U. S. Ties Hit Our Trade With China", Edmonton Journal (Southam News Services Release), March 21, 1969, p. 8.

³² Ibid.

³³ Trevor Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 94. Litvak and Maule also state that "[t]here is reason to believe that certain Canadian-owned companies avoid doing business with Communist China for fear of jeopardizing their significantly more important business interests in the United States." I. A. Litvak and C. J. Maule, "Conflict Resolution and Extraterritoriality", Conflict Resolution, XIII (September, 1969), 314.

³⁴ Pauline Jewett, "Retaliation: The Price of Independence?", An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, ed. by Stephen Clarkson (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1968), p. 52.

³⁵ Ibid. Although supporting evidence is rarely presented, Canadian scholars and journalists have, almost unanimously, considered the American influence to be a major factor in Canada's China policy. See, for example, Edgar McInnis, The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 156; Charles Hanley, "The Ethics of Independence", An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, ed. by Stephen Clarkson, pp. 21-22; James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1960), p. 72; James Eayrs, Northern Approaches: Canada and the Search for Peace (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1961), pp. 148-149 ff; E. D. Greathed, "Canada and the Asian World",

International Journal, XX (Summer, 1965), 369-370; John W. Holmes, "The Unequal Alliance: Canada and the United States", Fourth Seminar on Canadian-American Relations, Assumption of Windsor, November 8-11, 1962, pp. 261-262; Editorial, Globe and Mail, November 4, 1958; and Editorial, Maclean's, March 17, 1956.

³⁶ John W. Holmes, "Canada and the United States in World Politics", Foreign Affairs, XL (October, 1961), 110.

³⁷ Debates, November 28, 1963, Vol. V, p. 5194.

³⁸ Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, ed. by A. Doak Barnett (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 225.

³⁹ Lester B. Pearson, "Basis of Canadian Far Eastern Policy", External Affairs, III (February, 1951), 41.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "Excerpts from an Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Women's Canadian Club, Vancouver, B. C., August 25, 1955", Statements and Speeches, No. 55/30.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ "Some Blunt Words from a Good Neighbour", Look Magazine, January 10, 1956.

⁴⁶ Eayrs, Northern Approaches, p. 148.

⁴⁷ Lester B. Pearson, "External Affairs in Parliament; Statement of Government Policy", External Affairs, VIII (February-March, 1956), 66.

⁴⁸ Louis St. Laurent, "External Affairs in Parliament; Statement of Government Policy", External Affairs, VIII (May, 1956), 123.

⁴⁹ Lester B. Pearson, "Where Canada Stands in the World Crisis", Maclean's, July 6, 1957, p. 52.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Chester Ronning, "Canada, Asia and the United Nations", reprint of a speech delivered at the Banff Conference on World Affairs, 1966, p. 9.

⁵² Sidney Smith, "External Affairs in Parliament [Canada's Foreign Policy]", External Affairs, XI (March, 1959), 47.

⁵³ Howard Green, "A Canadian View of World Problems", External Affairs, XII (March, 1960), 546.

⁵⁴ Debates, November 1, 1957, 1957-1958 session, Vol. I, p. 654.

⁵⁵ Cited by R. Spencer, "External Affairs and Defence", Canadian Annual Review for 1963, ed. by John Saywell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 330.

⁵⁶ "Canada and the World [A Policy Statement Issued by Prime Minister Pierre E. Trudeau on May 29, 1968]", Statements and Speeches, No. 68/17.

⁵⁷ Bob Kidd, "Kennedy Urges China Recognition", Edmonton Journal (Southam News Services Release), March 21, 1969, p. 8.

⁵⁸ Cited by T. A. Hockin, "Ottawa-Peking Ties First Step to a China-U.S. 'Dialogue'?", Financial Post, LX (June 4, 1966), 13.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Jay Waltz, "An Informal Interview with Prime Minister Trudeau", New York Times, November 29, 1968.

⁶¹ "Canada, the U.S. and China", Canadian Business, XLII (April, 1969), 14.

⁶²Eayrs, Northern Approaches, pp. 153-154.

⁶³Ibid., p. 154.

CHAPTER VI

AN EVALUATION OF ROSENAU'S FRAMEWORK

Successive Canadian governments have repeatedly considered the question of recognition of the CPR since the latter's inception in 1949. Yet the issue has never become highly salient -- either to the decision-makers or to the public. This is probably due, at least in part, to the fact that the absence of diplomatic relations has not prevented economic intercourse between the two nations. If China's large purchases of Canadian wheat in the early 1960's had been specifically tied to recognition, it is likely that the issue would have been regarded by both officials and the public as a matter of great importance. However, although there has never been strong pressure exerted upon the government by the general public, public opinion has increasingly favoured recognition; moreover, the more influential segments of the public have consistently advocated it. Thus, while the government has not been continuously exhorted to recognize China by the public, neither has it been deterred from recognizing the CPR by societal pressures. Rather, it would seem that systemic considerations, i.e., American influence, have prevented Canada from extending recognition.

Within Rosenau's framework, the external factors which influence decision-making may be comprised of systemic variables or they may be a function of penetration.¹ In order to examine the applicability of Rosenau's pre-theory to the specific issue of Canadian recognition of China, it is necessary to determine whether or not American influence has led to the creation of a penetrated political system.

Rosenau introduces the concept of the penetrated system as a response to the increasing breakdown of the distinction between national and international systems. A penetrated political system may be defined as one in which

nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.²

Within such a system, the employment of coercion is regarded as legitimate by both the penetrated society's government and its citizenry. That is, whether decisions which are a function of penetration "are accepted regretfully or willingly" is irrelevant; they are legitimate in as much as "they are felt to be binding."³ The fact that such decisions are not legitimate from a strictly juridical standpoint is also irrelevant; "[t]he boundaries of

political systems are defined by activities and processes, not by legalities."⁴

In contrast, an international system is one in which

nonmembers indirectly and nonauthoritatively influence the allocation of a society's values and the mobilization of support for its goals through autonomous rather than through joint action.⁵

Clearly the two systems are to be distinguished by determining whether specific actions constitute participation or influence, whether they are taken autonomously or jointly, and whether they are direct, authoritative and legitimate, or indirect, nonauthoritative and lack legitimacy. Rosenau concedes that operationalization of the distinctions between political systems is difficult, and must be arbitrary. The problem is, however, partially resolved by the introduction of the concept of issue-areas -- "categories of issues that affect the political process in sufficiently similar ways to justify being clustered together."⁶ Using the concepts of penetration and issue-areas, Rosenau elaborates upon his initial ranking schema by positing the five sets of variables within a penetrated or non-penetrated system according to the particular issue-area involved.

Penetration may be so widespread that a penetrated

political system results. Vietnam, for instance, has become a penetrated political system as a result of extensive American participation in the Vietnamese decision-making process. On the other hand, penetration may be confined to one or more of the four issue-areas -- status, territorial, human resources and non-human resources. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the concept of issue-areas in detail. Suffice it to note that the issue of recognition of Communist China constitutes a vertical system within the status issue-area. Because the status issue-area is comprised of such diverse vertical systems as recognition of governments, civil rights movements and civic nominations, discernible boundaries can be depicted between the vertical systems. However, the concept of penetration is perhaps rendered unnecessarily limited when distinguishable boundaries are also posited between the issue-areas. For instance, I suggest that Canada is penetrated economically by the United States, and that the effects of penetration in this sphere (the non-human resources issue-area) may "spill over" into the status issue-area.

When the status issue-area is considered in isolation, an examination of Rosenau's formal definitions of political systems suggests that Canadian-American interaction on this issue manifests characteristics of an

international rather than a penetrated system. That is, the empirical evidence presented in Chapter V (see above) suggests that the United States has autonomously exerted indirect and non-authoritative influence upon Canadian policy. Direct threats of or use of coercion do not appear to have been exerted; instead, the Canadian government seems to have been deterred by such indirect factors as the predicted unfavourable response by the United States and an awareness that the United States was potentially capable of retaliating economically if Canada incurred American disfavour by extending recognition. If direct pressures have been applied, it is significant that Canadian government spokesmen have repeatedly denied their existence; such pressures would be regarded as neither authoritative nor legitimate, and hence would not be publicized. Further, statements that the Canadian government would consult with its allies before changing its policy in no way implied that a joint decision to recognize the CPR was necessary before Canada could extend recognition. Similarly, it is unlikely that any joint decision to withhold recognition has ever been made between Canada and the United States. On the basis of these considerations, Canada does not appear to be penetrated in the status issue-area.

Canada does, however, appear to be penetrated

economically. This penetration is primarily manifested by American investment in Canada and by the presence of Canadian subsidiaries of American companies. Canadian-American economic interaction is characterized by direct and authoritative American participation in Canada. On a strictly economic level, members and non-members of the Canadian political system participate jointly in the formation of decisions affecting Canadian subsidiaries. Politically, the extension of extra-territoriality (as defined in Chapter V above) by the United States is illustrative of the authoritative allocation of that nation's values. Moreover, the deterrent effect which American regulations of the Trading With the Enemy Act have imposed upon Canadian companies vis-à-vis trade with China indicates that American participation in Canadian decision-making is regarded as legitimate, i.e., binding.

In addition, Rosenau's contention that penetrated systems are characterized by a shortage or a plenitude of resources, appears more applicable to the system as a whole than to the status issue-area. Canada indeed possesses a plenitude of economic resources and, as Rosenau states, "as long as richly endowed societies maintain institutions that permit access to their resources, they are bound to become penetrated in certain respects."⁷ Thus the concept of penetration appears to be more

empirically meaningful as distinct boundaries are not drawn between the issue-areas. Since the effects of economic penetration extend beyond the boundaries of the economic sphere, it is evident that, at least on this particular issue, penetration extends horizontally from one issue-area to another rather than vertically within each isolated issue-area. That is, the existence of economic penetration enables the United States to influence Canadian policy by, for example, the promise of economic rewards or threats of economic punishment, or, more indirectly and more commonly, by the Canadian perception of the ability of the United States to reward or punish.

Because of the "spill-over" effects of economic penetration, Canada is, therefore, assumed to be penetrated in the status issue-area. The following ranking of variables -- according to Rosenau's diagrammatic elaboration of his pre-theory should now obtain: societal, role, systemic, governmental, idiosyncratic (see Table V). Clearly this ranking fails to describe the relative strength of the determinants of Canadian policy toward China. Two explanations are suggested. First, it is possible that this ranking is valid for prediction. Earlier, the problem of comparing the five sets of variables was partially resolved by the suggestion that the strength of the systemic and societal factors should

TABLE V

A FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE AUTHOR'S PRE-THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY, IN WHICH FIVE SETS OF VARIABLES UNDERLYING THE EXTERNAL BEHAVIOR OF SOCIETIES ARE RANKED ACCORDING TO THEIR RELATIVE POTENCIES IN SIXTEEN TYPES OF SOCIETIES AND THREE TYPES OF ISSUE-AREAS

Large Country															
Developed Economy								Underdeveloped Economy							
Open Polity				Closed Polity				Open Polity				Closed Polity			
Pene- trated				Nonpene- trated				Pene- trated				Nonpene- trated			
status area															
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Variables: i=idiosyncratic, r=role, g=governmental, s=societal, sy=systemic

TABLE V (Continued)

		Small Country											
		Developed Economy				Underdeveloped Economy							
		Open Polity			Closed Polity			Open Polity			Closed Polity		
Pene- trated		Nonpene- trated			Pene- trated			Pene- trated			Nonpene- trated		
status area		SY SY SY			r r r			SY SY SY			i i i		
nonhuman resource area		so r r			so SY SY			i SY SY			so SY SY		
other areas		r g so			i SY SY			r SY SY			g SY SY		
status area		i g i			g SY SY			g SY SY			g SY SY		
nonhuman resource area		i g i			g SY SY			g SY SY			g SY SY		
other areas		i g i			g SY SY			g SY SY			g SY SY		
status area		g SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY		
nonhuman resource area		r SY SY			r SY SY			r SY SY			r SY SY		
other areas		i SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY		
status area		SY SY SY			r SY SY			SY SY SY			SY SY SY		
nonhuman resource area		so r r			so SY SY			i SY SY			so SY SY		
other areas		r g so			i SY SY			r SY SY			g SY SY		
status area		i g i			g SY SY			g SY SY			g SY SY		
nonhuman resource area		i g i			g SY SY			g SY SY			g SY SY		
other areas		i g i			g SY SY			g SY SY			g SY SY		
status area		g SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY		
nonhuman resource area		r SY SY			r SY SY			r SY SY			r SY SY		
other areas		i SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY			i SY SY		

Variables: i=idiosyncratic, r=role, g=governmental, s=societal, sy=systemic

refer to their maximum potential strengths (see Chapter I above). If Canada is a large, developed and open society, then regardless of whether or not penetration exists, societal rather than systemic factors should be potentially capable of exerting the greater influence on government policy. Assuming that this interpretation is correct suggests the following hypothesis: despite strong systemic pressures opposing recognition, if societal pressures in favour of recognition were equally strong, then Canada would recognize the CPR. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this prediction; yet even if it were possible to verify its accuracy, the ranking is of limited utility because it does not explain why Canada has withheld recognition for twenty years.

Another method of examining the problem is to reassess the classification of Canada as a large, developed and open country. The ranking which best explains the relative strengths of the determinants of Canadian behaviour on this issue -- systemic, societal, role, governmental, idiosyncratic -- is the ranking which Rosenau assigns to a small, developed, open country, penetrated in the status issue-area. It is necessary, therefore, to re-examine the validity of positing Canada as a large nation.

It may be possible to classify Canada as a small

nation if the criterion of population is added to the criteria proposed by Rosenau -- geographical size and possession of resources. Yet the re-classification of Canada from a large to a small country solely on the basis of population is untenable because it assumes that the population factor is the most important determinant of size. There is, however, an additional rationale for considering a re-classification. Rosenau specifies that

the potency of a systemic variable is considered to vary inversely with the size of a country (there being greater resources available to larger countries and thus lesser dependence on the international system than is the case with smaller countries).⁸

As Canada is highly dependent upon the international system both economically and politically, it appears that if Rosenau's assumption is correct, Canada cannot logically be a large country. The premise that development of resources is also a determinant of size must be implicit in Rosenau's argument; surely the mere possession of resources will not, in itself, reduce dependence upon the international system. There appears to be sufficient justification, then, for positing Canada as a small country.

By expanding Rosenau's criteria for determining the size of a country and by modifying his concept of penetration, it is therefore possible to posit Canada as a small, developed, open nation -- penetrated with respect

to the issue of recognition of China. The ranking of variables which then obtains appears to best explain the relative strengths of the societal and systemic determinants of Canadian policy on this specific issue. However, no evidence has been presented which would, even tentatively, confirm or disconfirm the relative strengths of the role, governmental, and idiosyncratic variables suggested by this ranking. Moreover, it cannot be ascertained whether this ranking would be applicable to Canadian foreign policy in general or whether its usefulness is limited to the explanation of isolated policies.

FOOTNOTES

¹The existence of a penetrated political system does not, of course, exclude the influence of systemic factors. Indeed Rosenau acknowledges the existence of an interrelationship when he suggests that the systemic variables be raised one notch in penetrated systems. Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 89.

²Ibid., p. 65.

³Ibid., p. 64.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 65.

⁶James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area", Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. by James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 15. In "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", Rosenau provides a more complex definition: "an issue-area is conceived to consist of (1) a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which (2) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (3) they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values." Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 81. However, the more basic definition is sufficient for the purposes of this discussion.

⁷Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 69.

⁸Ibid., p. 47.

CONCLUSION

Rosenau's basic assumption that the establishment of a pre-theory is necessary if foreign policy analysis is to flourish is theoretically valid. A conceptual framework is necessary to compare the relative strengths of the determinants of external behaviour of various nations. However, the operationalization of Rosenau's pre-theory is extremely difficult. For example, Rosenau assumes that the characteristics of society -- large-small, developed-underdeveloped, and open-closed -- are continuous rather than discrete. Yet his framework posits each nation within a dichotomous classification. This classification precludes the consideration of variations in, for example, size, within each category. Further, if each classification is determined by several criteria, certain countries may exhibit characteristics of more than one category; Canada, for instance, possesses characteristics of both a large and a small country, and Rosenau provides no indication of which characteristics are of greatest importance. Similarly, penetration is assumed to be a continuous concept, yet its operationalization poses penetration-non-penetration as a dichotomy. Rosenau's suggestion that systemic variables be moved up a notch in penetrated systems does not allow for variations in

penetration; in addition, it is impossible to determine the extent to which penetration must exist before a penetrated political system is created.

It is also difficult to determine whether or not Rosenau's sets of variables are empirically meaningful. The categories appear to overlap to a significant degree; further, Rosenau has made no attempt to suggest how these factors may be measured and thus compared.

The concept of issue-areas appears, at least superficially, to be both theoretically and empirically deficient. In particular, it appears doubtful that the status issue-area has discernible boundaries and can be insulated from other issue-areas. However, an accurate assessment of its utility would necessitate far more extensive consideration than has been given in this paper.

The problems involved in operationalizing Rosenau's conceptual model and in measuring the strength of the variables within the framework do not, however, negate the potential utility of Rosenau's pre-theory. Rosenau in fact recognizes that modification and elaboration of his pre-theory may be necessary: "Indeed, given the present undeveloped state of the field, the rankings can neither be proved nor disproved."¹ Nevertheless, as a first step toward the establishment of "comprehensive systems of

testable generalizations",² Rosenau's pre-theory is a most valuable addition to the field of foreign policy analysis.

FOOTNOTES

¹Rosenau, "Pre-theories. . . .", p. 47.

²Ibid., p. 32.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

PARTY PREFERENCE

Party preference does not appear to be strongly associated with the direction of a respondent's opinion toward Canadian recognition of China. Table VI indicates that respondents who gave NDP as their party preference were most in favour of recognition. However, because the NDP party has, since 1949, consistently advocated Canadian recognition, the percentage of NDP supporters favouring recognition is lower than one might expect. On the other hand, the Social Credit party has generally opposed Canadian recognition and this fact appears to be reflected by the opinions expressed by Social Credit supporters. Respondents who indicated a preference for the Social Credit party constituted the group which was generally least in favour of recognition. (However, in 1959, 29% favoured recognition, whereas only 25% of Liberal Party supporters were in favour.) There appears to be little difference between the opinions of those who expressed a preference for the Liberal or Conservative parties.

TABLE VI
PARTY PREFERENCE

1959:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Yes	32%	37%	25%	54%	29%	(1)	21%
No	43	40	53	28	41	(2)	43
No opinion	<u>25</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>29</u>	(1)	<u>36</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%		100%
N	658	238	204	61	17	4	124

1964:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
Yes	51%	50%	56%	64%	46%	(1)	45%
No	33	36	28	22	37	(3)	39
No opinion	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>	-	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%
N	694	184	227	55	48	4	133

1966:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>P.C.</u>	<u>Lib.</u>	<u>N.D.P.</u>	<u>S.C.</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Unde-</u>	<u>Crede-</u>
Yes	55%	57%	55%	66%	39%	(2)	54%	(3)
No	27	29	31	20	36	(2)	27	(2)
No opinion	<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>25</u>	(1)	<u>19</u>	(2)
TOTAL	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	
N	696	121	200	105	28	5	180	7

*10 respondents refused to answer for 1959,
43 respondents for 1964, and 50 for 1966.

RELIGION

When opinions were correlated with religious affiliation, it became apparent that the Catholic respondents opposed recognition to a greater degree than the respondents of any other group. John Holmes has stated that, in Canada, there has been no organized or active protest by Catholics against relations with Communist China; however, "the intense abhorrence of Communist countries characteristic of majority Catholic opinion across the border is often reflected among French- and English-speaking Catholics."¹ The sample of Jewish respondents was too small to compare meaningfully with the other religious groups.

TABLE VII

RELIGION

Religious Affiliation

1959:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National Sample</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Jewish</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Others</u>
Yes	32%	38%	(4)	22%	55%
No	43	40	(3)	50	17
No opin- ion	<u>25</u>	<u>22</u>	(3)	<u>28</u>	<u>28</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%		100%	100%
N	658	353	10	277	18

1964:

Yes	51%	57%	(4)	42%	57%
No	33	29	(2)	41	19
No opin- ion	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	-	<u>17</u>	<u>24</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%		100%	100%
N	694	379	6	288	21

1966:

Yes	55%	62%	(10)	43%	75%
No	27	24	(4)	34	10
No opin- ion	<u>17</u>	<u>14</u>	(2)	<u>22</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	99%	100%		99%	100%
N	696	349	16	283	48

REGION

Table VIII suggests that residents of Quebec and the Maritimes have consistently favoured recognition to a lesser degree than either the national average or residents of any other region. In contrast, respondents of British Columbia have strongly favoured recognition. Also, between 1959 and 1966, the percentage of respondents in favour of recognition in the prairie provinces has risen markedly -- Manitoba, 28% to 65%; Saskatchewan, 50% to 69%; Alberta, 48% to 68%. Because supporting evidence is unavailable, the reasons for this increase and the observed regional variances can only be suggested. If increased trade resulted from recognition, British Columbia and the prairie provinces would be the major recipients. Lloyd has stated that during 1957, 1958, and 1959, "[a]pproval of recognition for economic reasons was naturally at its strongest in British Columbia, the province most likely to gain from expanded trade. . . ."² In addition, the major wheat sales transacted between Canada and China, beginning in 1961, may have contributed to the change in attitude toward recognition manifested by respondents in the prairie provinces.

Recognition has been a more salient issue to respondents of the prairie provinces and British Columbia than to their counterparts in Ontario and the Maritimes. Further,

the data correlating opinion with religion revealed that Catholics were the group least in favour of recognition. It is possible, therefore, that the preponderance of Catholics in Quebec explains why so few respondents in that province have favoured recognition.

TABLE VIII

REGION

1959:

<u>Opinion</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Maritimes</u>	<u>Que.</u>	<u>Ont.</u>	<u>Man.</u>	<u>Sask.</u>	<u>Alta.</u>	<u>B.C.</u>
Yes	32%	20%	18%	34%	28%	50%	48%	51%
No	43	51	45	47	52	17	39	35
No opin- ion	<u>25</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	658	59	182	243	25	40	46	63

1964:

Yes	51%	49%	42%	56%	49%	46%	36%	69%
No	33	28	38	31	34	35	48	25
No opin- ion	<u>16</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	694	69	191	245	35	43	44	67

1966:

Yes	55%	50%	47%	53%	65%	69%	68%	68%
No	27	26	31	30	19	22	25	17
No opin- ion	<u>17</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	99%	100%	99%	100%	99%	100%	100%	99%
N	696	68	196	245	26	54	55	63

APPENDIX II

Paul and Laulicht's study, In Your Opinion, represents an attempt to determine the influence of various groupings of the public upon governmental policy on specific issues in Canada.³ The authors used data from a survey conducted by the Canadian Peace Research Institute between November 1962 and February 1963. Four groups were interviewed at an average of one hour per interview: a representative national sample (N) of 1,000 adults of voting age; forty-eight business leaders (B) chosen at random among presidents of companies with assets of greater than \$100 million and members on the Boards of Directors of Canadian Chartered Banks; forty-eight labour leaders (L) randomly chosen among senior officers of national trade union federations and leaders of national unions whose membership exceeded 10,000; and forty-eight Members of Parliament (P) selected in proportion to party standing in the House of Commons. There were eighteen front benchers, five senior advisors to front benchers; the remainder were UN or NATO delegates or members of the Foreign Affairs committee. (There were nineteen Conservatives, eighteen Liberals, six Social Credit, and five NDP members.) In the case of the three elite groups (business, labour and political), the aim was not to obtain a representative sample of each group, but rather to obtain a representative sample of the most influential members of these three groups. It was

assumed that these groups, in comparison to the general public, had the greatest and about equal influence upon governmental policy.

As part of an effort to determine and compare attitudes of the various groups toward coexistence with Communist nations, respondents were asked to state their opinions on Canadian grain sales to China and admission of that country to the United Nations.

"Do you think that Canada should or should not sell grain to Communist China?"

<u>Opinion:</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>P</u>
should	65%	88%	90%	85%
should not	26	10	6	15
don't know	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1,000	48	48	48

"As you may know, Communist China is not at present a member of the United Nations, but Nationalist China is. What do you think should be done about this?"

<u>Opinion:</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>P</u>
Communist China should be admitted to the UN, even if this means dropping Nationalist China from membership	6%	25%	25%	12%
Communist China should be admitted to the UN, and National- ist China should also keep its membership	44	60	63	75

<u>Opinion:</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>P</u>
Communist China should not be admitted to the UN	36%	13%	10%	13%
don't know	<u>14</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1,000	48	48	48

The results of the CPRI survey clearly show that members of the business, labour and political elites overwhelmingly favour both Canadian grain sales to China and China's admission to the United Nations. Their opinions contrast markedly with those held by the general public. Paul and Laulicht suggest that the influence of the elite groups upon governmental decision-making is considerable. However, because a positive relationship between these issues and the issue of recognition cannot easily be established, it cannot be concluded from this data that elites have attempted to influence the government to recognize China. At best it can be concluded that these groups have generally exhibited "a favourable attitude toward China."

FOOTNOTES

¹

John Holmes, "Canada and China", Policies Toward China, ed. by A. M. Halpern (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 115.

²

Lloyd, Canada in World Affairs, 1957-1959, p. 178.

³

John Paul and Jerome Laulicht, In Your Opinion, Vol. I (Clarkson, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963).

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